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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL
RULEMAKING RELATING TO PUBLIC
PROPERTY, LOANS, GRANTS,
BENEFITS, OR CONTRACTS
ARTHUR EARL BoNFiELD t
I.

THE PROBLEM

In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure concluded that the rulemaking processes of federal agencies
"should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons
affected to present their views, the facts within their knowledge, and
the dangers and benefits of alternative courses." 1 The Committee
realized that the knowledge of an administrative agency is rarely complete, an administrative agency is not ordinarily a representative body,
its deliberations are not usually carried on in public, and its members
are not subject to direct political controls in the same way as are
legislators. Consequently, public participation "in the rule-making
process is essential in order to permit administrative agencies to inform
themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to private interests." 2
The message of the Attorney General's Committee is as sensible today
as it was when first communicated. Very substantial reasons suggest
that the interested public should have an adequate opportunity to
contribute to the rulemaking process.
The most obvious reason why such public participation is desirable
is that it helps to elicit "the information, facts, and probabilities which
are necessary to fair and intelligent action" I by those responsible for
promulgating administrative rules. Since an agency's own accumulated
knowledge and expertise are rarely sufficient to provide all the needed
data upon which rulemaking decisions should be based, agency communication with interested parties on the subject of proposed regulations is essential. Such parties are usually in the best position to
* This Article is based upon a report prepared by the author under the auspices of
the Administrative Conference of the United States. The Conference, however, does
not in any way approve it or evaluate its content, which is the sole responsibility of the
author. A recommendation on this subject made by the Administrative Conference
may be found in the appendix to this article.
t Law School Foundation Professor, University of Iowa. B.A. 1956, Brooklyn
College; LL.B. 1960, LL.M. 1961, Yale University. Admitted to practice in Conand Iova.
necticut
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FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRocEDuRE 102 (1941) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FINAL REPORT].
21d. 103, quoted in S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1946) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 248] (justification for enacting § 4 of Administrative Procedure Act). S. Doc. No. 248 is the official legislative history of the APA and
conveniently collects working papers and committee reports.
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provide much of the specific information necessary for wise rule
formulation. An opportunity for interested persons to inform appropriate administrators of facts, views, or arguments that they consider relevant to any proposed rule is, therefore, necessary for the
sound operation of government."
Other reasons also dictate our government's need to involve
interested parties in the formulation of rules by affording them the
opportunities just noted. Thirty years ago it was asserted that "our
conception of administrative responsibility is undergoing profound
change. The emphasis is shifting; instead of [public] subserviency
to arbitrary will [of administrators] we require [administrative] responsiveness to commonly felt needs and wants." ' When interested
parties have a chance to communicate facts and opinions bearing on
proposed regulations to the appropriate authorities, the latter are likely
to become more responsive to the problems of those involved than
would otherwise be the case.
Public involvement in the formulation of rules is also an excellent
way to implement the ideal of participatory democracy. If we assure
interested parties an opportunity to influence the decision-makers by
communicating with them, public involvment in the rulemaking process
will expand, making the process more representative. Public participation in rulemaking may be particularly helpful when an agency
promulgates an unpopular rule. Dissenters may be less likely to
sabotage a rule in an active way if they have had an adequate opportunity to present their objections prior to its promulgation. Moreover,
the failure of officials to secure views from the relevant public before
regulations are issued may result in a lack of administrative preparation
for certain problems that could arise from those rules' application, or
the community's reaction to them.
Parties affected by administrative rules have a distinct personal
interest in how they are made. An adequate opportunity to present
relevant information to appropriate officials is one of the most important tools with which individuals can defend themselves against an
exercise of rulemaking power that may be detrimental to their interests.
Political realities may make legislative modification of unwise regu4
Recognition of the value of such public participation in government policy
formulation was reflected in the May, 1969, action of the President's Task Force on
Oil Import Quota Controls. Although not required to do so, the Task Force decided
to assure that all relevant information and opinion on the question of oil import quota
controls was before it by inviting interested persons to "submit concise written comments to the task force on whether oil imports should remain subject to reduction and,
if so, to what degree and by what means." 34 Fed. Reg. 7264 (1969). The Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure made a similar broad solicitation of
views in 1940. ATroRN'EY GENERAL's FINAL REPORT 4-5.

GFriedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in

PUBLIC ADmlNIsTRATIoN AND POLICY 241 (P. Woll ed. 1966).
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lations hopeless; and the breadth of agency discretion may make
judicial assaults unsuccessful. In cases of this sort, an opportunity
for affected parties to communicate their views on proposed rules to
the appropriate officials may be the only meaningful chance those parties
will have to protect their interests against rules they consider unwise.
It should be clear that the public participation in rulemaking under
discussion here is only directed at assuring an adequate opportunity
for interested persons to communicate their views, information, and
the like, to the relevant government officials. There is no intention to
transfer the actual decision-making power with respect to rules to the
interested public. Meaningful public participation in the formulation
of administrative rules does not "in any way affect the authority of the
agency or its discretion. All that is required is the giving of .
an opportunity to interested persons to present their views concerning
the proposed rule. The department or agency may give such consideration to the views presented as it deems warranted under the facts." 0
To be meaningful, the opportunity to communicate with respect
to proposed rules need not necessarily require oral hearings; indeed,
written submissions will usually be adequate. Such an assurance of
public participation in rulemaking does require, however, that the
public be given timely notice of all proposed rulemaking and that an
indication of the subject matter of the rulemaking in question be included. Otherwise, the public participation which results will probably
be diffuse and of little real value either to the participating
parties or to the agency .

.

.

.Hence, sound practice dictates

that ordinary [notice of such rulemaking and opportunities
to participate] be accompanied by tentative drafts of the regulations being considered or by a precise statement of7 the
subjects which it is expected may ultimately be touched.
In addition to general notice of proposed regulations, adequate
public participation in the rulemaking process requires that the exact
terms of a new rule be published a reasonable time before its effective
date. Otherwise, even if the public has participated in the preliminary
formulation of a rule, the final details of its exact text may not be
known to interested parties until the date of its promulgation as law.
A procedure for delayed effectiveness is, therefore, necessary "to correct
error or oversight in regulations before, rather than after, they become
effective." 8 Such a safeguard procedure will "afford persons affected
6 Co MIssxoN ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANcH

MENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PRoCDURE 160
after cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
7.ATToRNEY GNER' 's FINAL REPORT 108 (emphasis added).
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a reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule or rules or
to take any other action which the issuance of the rules may prompt." '
Meaningful public participation in the rulemaking process would
also seem to demand recognition of another administrative obligation
and private right. Interested parties should be able, on their own
motion, to induce a reasoned consideration of the propriety of the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule, by those authorized to make
and modify rules. Absent this ability of the concerned public, administrators satisfied with the status quo might neglect to reexamine their
position in light of any new views or information that becomes available. A right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule and to receive a reasoned response thereto is not only valuable as
a protection for private interests, but is also necessary to assure sound
government. It forces agencies to reconsider their position with respect
to existing or proposed rules in light of petitioners' objections, therefore making it likely that wiser policies will be pursued with respect to
those rules than would otherwise be the case.
At some point, however, requirements of the sort discussed above
may directly conflict with other values important to the operation of our
polity. More specifically, there is an obvious need to conduct our
government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively, and inexpensively.
No rulemaking scheme may be considered acceptable unless it fairly
reconciles these latter values with the societal interest in maximizing
public participation in the development of administrative regulations.
Imposition of requirements on the rulemaking process that unduly fetter
agency action, or frustrate its purposes, would obviously strike an inadequate balance between the competing values involved. Yet the interest
in involving interested parties in rulemaking is not so slight that it
should be set aside solely on the basis of minor inconvenience or expense
to government.
Section 4 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
now 5 U.S.C. § 553, attempts to reconcile this conflict between the
need for public participation in rulemaking and the need for efficient,
expeditious, effective, and inexpensive government. That provision
states:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that there is involved(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 201, 259.
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(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto
are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice
shall include(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public
rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule
or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this
subsection does not apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing, section 556 and 557 of this title apply
instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule
shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date,
except(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an
exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause
found and published with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
Another provision of the APA "ostates that for these purposes
"rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed
10 Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. IV, 1969). On
the definition of "rule" see 1 K. DAVIs, ADM iNsmw2IvW LAw TREATiSE § 5.02 (1958).
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to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements
of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or
reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting,
or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
The specific question to be examined here is whether section 553
satisfactorily accommodates the competing interests involved insofar
as it unqualifiedly exempts from the required rulemaking procedures of
that provision all rulemaking "relating to . . . public property, loans,

grants, benefits, or contracts." Because of the strong societal interests
in assuring public participation in the rulemaking process, these section
553 (a) (2) exemptions may be justified only insofar as they are
narrowly tailored to preserve those other societal interests conflicting
with the need for public involvement in the process, in a degree related
to their comparative importance. That is, exemptions from an obligation imposed on agencies to implement public participation in rulemaking should be countenanced only to the extent to which they are
absolutely necessary to preserve other values of equal or greater
importance.
The inquiry here is intentionally limited to the section 553 (a) (2)
exemptions for "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
The present study will not consider the merits of any other exemptions
contained in section 553. It will not, for example, consider the section
553(b) (A) and section 553(d) (2) exemptions for interpretive rules
and statements of policy, the section 553 (a) (1) exemptions for "military or foreign affairs function[s]," or the'section 553(a)(2) exemption for "a matter relating to agency management or personnel."
There are several reasons why this study will not even consider
the other section 553 (a) exemptions just noted. The latter exemptions
involve problems that are distinctly separable from, and more difficult
to resolve satisfactorily than, those associated with the former exemptions. The interests underlying the inclusion of the other exemptions in the statute are severable in most respects from the interests
said to justify the former. There also seems to be greater demand for
abolition of the "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts"
exemption than for the other unqualified section 553(a) exemptions.
Moreover, there is a greater willingness among the government
agencies involved to suffer a modification of these (a) (2) exemptions
than the others. Practically speaking, the military, foreign affairs, and
agency management exemptions seem to be more impervious to change
than the section 553 (a) (2) exemptions to be examined here. Lastly,
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the exemptions on which this Article will concentrate can analytically
be considered as a unit, separate from the others; and of all the section
553 (a) exemptions, they may do the greatest damage with the least
justification.
Of course, other exemptions contained in section 553 will be
scrutinized to the extent that this becomes necessary to analyze properly
the problem under consideration. The above discussion is in no way
meant to suggest that the exemptions for the military, foreign affairs,
and agency management functions are unrelated to, or completely
separable from, those section 553(a) (2) provisions being examined
here. Indeed, if reform is required in this area, it may be difficult in
the long run without some modification of all these exemptions. For
example, modification or elimination of the contracts exemption in
section 553(a) (2), should that prove desirable, would still leave
virtually all contracts for military procurement excluded from section
553 under the military functions exemption of subsection (a) (1). And
elimination of the public property exemption would still leave rulemaking relating to the largest portion of federal property exempt,
because it is owned by the Department of Defense and used in the
performance of military functions.
However, an evaluation of the section 553 exemptions may be
made most satisfactorily in steps. If the "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts" exemption can be adequately dealt with here,
future studies may more easily be able to move on to a dispassionate
appraisal of the desirability of the other section 553 exemptions. The
current study will, therefore, deal only with these exemptions which
will be referred to throughout the remainder of this Article as the
section 553 (a) (2) or subsection (a) (2) exemptions.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 553(b)-(e)
Subsections (b)-(e) of section 553 attempt to assure that the
public has an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rulemaking
process. The provisions of section 553 (b) require that an agency
contemplating the issuance of a substantive rule " must publish a notice
in the Federal Register of the proposed rulemaking indicating the time,
place, and nature of the public rulemaking proceeding, and a statement
11 Section 553(b) (A) expressly exempts "interpretive rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from the notice
requirements. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL's MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRoCEDuRE ACT 30 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENRAL.'s
MANUAL], stating that this restricts the application of the notice and participation
requirements in what is now §§ 553(b) - (c) "to substantive rules issued pursuant to
statutory authority" (citing a portion of the statute's legislative history, S. Doc. No.
248, at 19).
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of the specific legal authority under which the rule is proposed.' 2 In
addition, the agency must include either the actual provisions of the
proposed rule, or a summary statement of the subjects or issues to
which they relate. The notice involved "must be sufficient to fairly
apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may
present responsive data or argument relating thereto" as they are
entitled to do under the following subsection of section 553.13 The
agency has the option of dispensing with such publication in the
Federal Register only if the notice requirement described above is
functionally satisfied because all "persons subject thereto are named
and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law."
After giving notice, agencies are required by section 553(c) to
accord interested persons a chance to participate in the particular rulemaking involved "through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." In practice,
the precise procedure actually utilized
may take a variety of forms: informal hearings (with or
without a stenographic transcript), conferences, consultation
with industry committees, submission of written views, or
any combination of these. . . . In each case, the selection of
the procedure to be followed will depend largely upon the
nature of the rules involved. The objective should be to
assure informed administrative action and adequate protection
to private interests. 14
It must be reiterated, however, that according to the statute, interested
persons must at the very minimum be afforded an opportunity to
submit "written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation." "5
An agency must review the materials presented to it in the course
of such public rulemaking proceedings and include in any rules result12The House Report on the APA stated that "[t]he required specification of legal
authority must be done with particularity. Statements of issues in the general statutory
language of legislative delegations of authority to the agency would not be a compliance with the section." S. Doc. No. 248, at 258.
'1 S. Doc. No. 248, at 200, 258. See also California Citizens Band Ass'n. v.
United States, 375 F2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1967), stating that the section requiring
that notice be given concerning contents of proposed rules of the administrative agency
"does not require an agency to publish in advance every precise proposal which it
may ultimately adopt as a rule. . . . A notice of rulemaking is sufficient if it provides
a description of subjects and issues involved."
14

ATToRNTEY

GzER.Ai.'s

MANUAL

31. The legislative history clearly indicates

that §553(c) "leaves agencies free to choose from the several common types of
informal public rule making procedures, the simplest of which is to permit interested
persons to submit written views or data . . . . " S. Doc. No. 248, at 19.
IGS. Doc. No. 248, at 200, 259.
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ing from this process a statement of their basis and purpose." Nevertheless, it is clear that the statute "does not require the formulation
of rules upon the exclusive basis of any 'record' made in informal rulemaking proceedings." '7 However, where statutes require a particular kind of rule to "be made on the record after an opportunity for
an agency hearing" other provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act outlining more formal hearing requirements will govern that proceeding instead of these informal section 553 provisions; "8and in such
a case, the rule must be made on the formal "record" so adduced.
Neither the advance notice nor public participation requirements
outlined above apply in those cases where "the agency for good cause
finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." The
provision just quoted will be discussed in more detail later in this
Article.
Two other subsections of section 553 impose conditions with respect to rules and rulemaking that are operative even if the notice and
public participation requirements of section 553(b)-(c) are not applicable because they come within the "good cause" exception just
noted. Section 553 (e) insists that every agency give interested persons
"the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
The mere filing of such a petition does not, however, require an agency
to engage in a public rulemaking proceeding on that subject. 9 The
agency must act on the petition in accordance with its procedures
promulgated under other provisions of the APA,2 ° and may grant
such a petition, undertake public rulemaking proceedings in relation
to it, or deny the petition. The chief practical significance of this
express right to petition requirement seems to be that the denial of a
section 553 (e) petition is governed by the provisions of section 555 (e),
which require a prompt notice of the denial "accompanied by a brief
" 21
statement of the grounds ....
16 "The agency must analyze and consider all relevant matter presented.

The

required statement of rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but
with reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule." Id.
at 201, 259.
17
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 31 (citing Hearingson S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 1, pt. 3, at 444 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings], which is limited
authority for the otherwise sound concluson of the MANUAL on this point because the
testimony referred to is that of only a single person, Commissioner C. B. Aitchison
of the ICC).
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (Supp. IV, 1969).
1

9 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 38; S. Doc. No. 248, at 201, 260.
20 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (1) (B)-(C) (Supp. IV, 1969) ; S. Doc. No. 248, at 260.
21
ATTORNEY GFNERAL's MANUAL 39 (citing S. Doc. No. 248, at 201, 260).
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A further requirement may be found in section 553 (d) relating to
the time period that agencies must allow between the promulgation of
a substantive rule and its effective date. It states that the required
publication of a substantive rule under section 552, the freedom of
information provision of the Act, must be made at least thirty days prior
to the effective date.' The thirty day notice provision, like the right to
petition an agency for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule, is
applicable even if the public rulemaking procedures of section
553(b)-(c) are not, because they are found to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 2 Exceptions are provided to this last noted time requirement, however, in those situations
where the substantive rule "grants or recognizes an exemption or
relieves a restriction." An exemption is also provided where the
agency decides, "for good cause found and published with the rule,"
that such a minimum thirty day period between the time of a rule's
publication and its taking effect is unnecessary. This last exemption
will also be discussed in more detail later in the Article.
III. SECTION 553(b)-(e) IN

RELATION TO THE

SUBSECTION (a) EXEMPTIONS
The exemptions contained in section 553(a) for rulemaking involving "a military or foreign affairs function," rulemaking "relating
to agency management or personnel," and rulemaking relating to
"public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" operate to exclude
entirely, and without qualification, all rulemaking in these categories
from every provision of subsections 553(b)-(e). Consequently, none
of the requirements imposed on administrative agencies by the provisions previously discussed are applicable to these specifically exempted
classes of rulemaking. This means, for example, that unless some other
statute specifically directs the contrary,2 4 agencies making rules relating
22See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 36, stating that "[t]he discussion on section
. . . [553 (d)] in the reports of both the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary makes clear that the phrase 'The required publication or service of any substantive rule' does not relate back or refer to the publication of general notice of proposed
rulemaking required by [§ 553(b)] ; rather it is a requirement that substantive rules
which must be published in the Federal Register [see § 553(a) (1) (D)] shall be so
published at least thirty days prior to their effective date." The language of § 553(c)
does, of course, lend itself more readily to the opposite construction, but it seems to
have been construed only in the manner suggested by the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL.
See also Lansden v. Hart, 168 F2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948); TAsE FoRcE
REPORT 160. The legislative history referred to may be found in S. Doc. No. 248,
at 201, 259.
23 S. Doc. No. 248, at 200-01, 259.
2
4 Another statute will control if it directs that certain kinds of rules relating, for
example, to loans, grants, or benefits be made in accordance with the requirements
of §§ 553(b) - (e). See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. IV, 1969). The following statement
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to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" are never,
under any circumstances, obliged as a matter of law to do any of the
following things: (1) publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register according to specifications of section 553 (b); (2)
give interested people a chance to participate in the formulation of rules
through submission of views or data, according to the terms of section
553 (c) ; (3) give interested persons "the right to petition for issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule," according to the terms of section
553 (e) ; or (4) publish substantive rules at least thirty days before their
effective date as required by section 553(d).'
The blanket language
of section 553(a) makes no allowance whatsoever for the possibility
that certain rulemaking within its terms may need to be exempted from
some of the subsection (b)-(e) requirements and not from others.
Similarly, this provision does not recognize that certain rulemaking
within its terms may need exemption from all of those requirements
and other such rulemaking from none of them.
The exemptions currently found in section 553(a) obviously
proceed upon the assumption that a sweeping judgment can be made
concerning those categories of subjects. The policies favoring public
participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the consequences of
subjecting these particular classes of rulemaking to the requirements
of subsections (b)-(e), or the consequences of utilizing a more flexible
approach to determine whether, in any given case, they should be
subjected to those requirements. The validity of this assumption must
be carefully examined and tested with respect to the exemptions for
"public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
It should be stressed that in those cases where rulemaking is
excepted from the requirements of section 553 by subsection (a),
agencies may use any rulemaking procedure they please, with or without public participation, unless another statute specifies the contrary.
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act clearly
indicates, however, that none of the blanket introductory exceptions
from the section "is to be taken as encouraging agencies not to adopt
voluntary public rule making procedures where useful to the agency or
beneficial to the public. The exceptions merely confer a complete discretion upon agencies to decide what, if any, public rule making procedures they will adopt in a given situation within their terms." 26
However, the fact is that most agencies do not usually exercise
their discretion to follow the requirements of section 553 (b) -(e) when
made during the Congressional hearings on the APA supports this conclusion:
"These exceptions would not, of course, relieve any agency from requirements imposed
by other
statutes." S. Doc. No. 248, at 199.
25
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 39; S. Doc. No. 248, at 199, 257.
26 S. Doc. No. 248, at 199, 257.
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they are not bound to do so. Consider agency practice with respect
to that rulemaking of primary concern here-rulemaking relating to
"public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." A survey prepared for this study, and distributed under the auspices of the Rulemaking Committee of the Administrative Conference of the United
States during the summer of 1969, asked each federal agency:
Does your department or agency follow the procedures
specified by § 553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking exempted from
those provisions by § 553(a) (1)-(2) ? If it does, list the
particular kinds of rulemaking exempted by § 553 (a) (1 )-(2)
for which your department or agency has voluntarily chosen
to follow some or all of the procedures specified by
§ 553(b)-(e). Explain. Also list the frequency with which
it voluntarily follows those requirements for such exempted
rulemaking, and the specific circumstances under which it
does so.
Responses to this question by those agencies reporting that they make
rules relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" 17
indicate a pattern. Rulemaking excluded by this part of subsection
(a) (2) from the mandatory terms of section 553(b)-(e) usually will
not be conducted according to those procedures. That is, most responding agencies indicated that they do not normally follow the
provisions of section 553(b)-(e) when their rulemaking is excepted
from them by subsection (a) (2).28 And while a number of agencies
indicated that they engaged in a contrary practice with respect to such
rulemaking, most of these admitted to some inconsistency in this
regard.2
27 The following agencies responded to the survey questionnaire prior to September
8, 1969, and indicated that they made rules relating to "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts": Department of the Treasury; Small Business Administration;
Department of Agriculture; Department of Defense; Veterans' Administration; Post
Office Department; Department of Commerce; Atomic Energy Commission; Department of Transportation; Department of Labor; the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare; Office of Economic Opportunity; and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. It is the responses of the above agencies that will be discussed
in this study [hereinafter cited as 1969 Survey].
28See, e.g., the following responses to the 1969 Survey question. The Atomic
Energy Commission reported that "The A.E.C. does not follow the procedures specified
by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(e) for the rulemaking . . . which is exempted from such
procedures." The Small Business Administration reported that "S.B.A. does not, as
a general rule, follow the requirements of notice of proposed rulemaking and public
participation for programs exempt from section 553, although some qualifying comment may be appropriate." The Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported that "the Department has followed the procedures specified by 5 U.S.C.
553(b)-(e) for rulemaking exempted from those provisions by §553(a)(2), on
occasion;

. ..

"

The Department of Defense and the Veterans' Administration an-

swered "No," and the Department of Agriculture's various divisions indicated that
they rarely, if ever, followed usual §§ 553(b)-(e) procedures in cases of rulemaking
exempted by § 553(a) (2).
2 See, e.g., the following responses to the 1969 Survey question. The Post Office
Department stated that "The Department normally follows the procedures of sec.
553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking leading to the adoption of regulations relating to
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Not only do agencies generally fail to follow the procedures of
section 553(b)-(e) in most cases where they are not required to do
so, but the public rulemaking procedures actually utilized by administrators in the excepted situations are frequently inadequate substitutes
for those found in section 553 (b)-(e). 30 The survey prepared for this
study asked reporting agencies:
What rulemaking procedures does your department or agency
use in those cases where its rulemaking is exempted by

§553(a)(1)-(2) from the requirements of §553(b)-(e)
and it does not choose, in its discretion, to follow § 553(b)-(e) ? Be as specific as possible. Include a concrete
example of each of the different kinds of rulemaking procedures utilized by your department or agency when it does
not follow § 553(b)-(e) because the rulemaking involved is

exempted by § 553(b) (1)-(2).

Responses indicate that substitute procedures are not always consistent
and do not, in many cases, assure adequate notice to affected parties
and a sufficient opportunity for their participation. In some cases, the
agencies may simply determine the rule they think appropriate and
promulgate it, without first notifying or consulting with anyone outside
the Government. In other such cases, agencies give notice to, and
engage in informal consultation with, whomever they happen to think
appropriate under the circumstances.3 1 The actual procedures utilized
domestic mail service when it is considered that the regulation may have a substantial
or adverse effect on the public . . . . By way of illustration it was undertaken on
twelve occasions during 1968." However, much rulemaking relating to Post Office
contracts and the management of Post Office property seems not to be subjected to usual
§ 553 requirements. The Department of Transportation stated that "With respect to
Parts 151, 153, 155, 159, 165, 167, and 169 of title 14, C.F.R. . . . the Department
does follow all of the section 553 rulemaking procedures, even though exempted therefrom under 553(a) (2), except for minor or technical amendments." However, this
means that it does not follow § 553(b) - (e) with respect to rulemaking relating to
other Department programs which it lists as exempted by the § 553(a) (2) exceptions
under study here. The Department of Commerce reported that some of its divisions,
like the Office of State Technical Services, usually follow § 553(b) - (e) in cases
exempted by subsection (a) (2); while others, like the Domestic and International
Business Division, do not. The Department of Labor also indicated that it usually
follows §§ 553(b) - (e) with respect to rulemaking of general applicability.
3o Imposition of the §§ 553 (b) - (e) requirements on rulemaking currently excluded
from the ambit of those provisions by § 553(a) (2) has been opposed by some agencies
on the grounds that it is unnecessary as applied to them. They maintain that substitute procedures actually utilized assure adequate notice and participation. See, e.g.,
Hearingson S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comnn. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (General Services
Administration) and 494-95 (Dept. of Defense) (1964) [hereinafter cited as S.1663
Hearings]. See also Hearings on S. 518 Before the Subcomn. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1st Sess.
246, 379 (1967) (Veterans' Administration, Dept. of Interior) [hereinafter cited as
S. 518 Hearings]. These are not, of course, disinterested judgments, and their validity
is, therefore, disputable.
31 See, e.g., the following responses to the 1969 Survey question. The Small
Business Administration reported that "parts 112 and 113 Nondiscrimination in
Financial Assistance Programs of S.B.A., were prepared internally, but cleared with
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in those cases where agencies are not required to follow section 553
because of subsection (a) (2) may, therefore, often result in a failure to
32
invite interested persons to participate in the formulation of a rule.
Some agencies do utilize substitute procedures that in fact assure
adequate notice to affected parties, and a sufficient opportunity for
their participation. In a number of cases, those substitute procedures
have been specially instituted to cure, at least partially, the failure of
section 553 to cover rulemaking relating to "public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts." Chief among these is a procedure announced by the Bureau of the Budget in Circular No. A-85 on June
28, 1967. This document applies to most "regulations and revisions
thereof which implement a Federal Assistance Program that includes
among its eligible recipients state or local governments or quasi public
agencies." 3 It provides that an agency shall give the Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) a copy of each such
proposed regulation at least 45 days before it is to be promulgated. If
legal or other circumstances make this impossible, the agency is to
advise the ACIR of this fact, and at least provide it with a summary
or abstract in lieu of the regulation. 34 The ACIR is then to transmit
copies of such materials to a number of specific state and local governthe Department of Justice. . . . Rules setting forth the policies, proceedings, and
requirements for loan, procurement and other assistance programs are also prepared
internally. But in many cases the programs will require or be substantially fostered
by contribution from non-governmental sources." The Post Office noted that "when
statutory procedures are not used the Department develops its regulations through
informal discussions with those to be affected, by negotiation, or by internal decisionmaking processes." The Department of Agriculture's Rural Electrification Agency
reported that "R.E.A. Bulletins are formulated by staff members responsible for the
program aspects involved in the proposed bulletin with final review and approval by an
Assistant Administrator, Deputy Administrator, or the Administrator. Within the
discretion of R.E.A., drafts of bulletins may be discussed informally with representatives of borrowers, contractors, engineers, and other parties interested in R.E.A. programs prior to issuance." The Production Stabilization Division of the Department
of Agriculture noted that "almost without exception, the final regulation is published
in the Federal Register without prior notice .

.

.

."

The same Department also

stated that new rules "are prepared by the Farmers Home Administration National
Office, with the advice and assistance of the Office of the General Counsel of this
Department. . . . Field employees are in daily contact with Farmers Home Administration borrowers and other recipients of Farmers Home Administration assistance
and are fully cognizant of their needs and views. Field employees are many times
called upon to serve on committees or submit their comments in connection with the
development or revision of F.H.A. instructions of major significance.'
See also
responses to a somewhat similar survey question supporting the same point in Bonfield,
Representation for the Poor in Federal Rudemaking, 67 MIcHr. L. REv. 511, 547 nn.41
& 42 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield].
32Officials of a number of major organizations purporting to represent some
segment of the poor have complained, for example, of inadequate notice with respect
to proposed rules of interest to them, and of many agencies' lack of interest in ascertaining their views in relation to rulemaking affecting the poor. A number of federal
agencies have also tacitly admitted that current rulemaking procedures utilized in some
rulemaking relating to the subjects exempted by §553(a) have been inadequate to
assure sufficient representation for the poor in federal rulemaking. See Bonfield 518-19.
B.O.B. Circular No. A-85, § 4 (June 28, 1967).
34Id. § 5(a).
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ment associations such as the National Governors' Conference, Council
of State Governments, and the United States Conference of Mayors,
who will then have up to three weeks within which to comment to
the federal agency involved on the proposed regulation."
As helpful as BOB Circular A-85 may be, it is no substitute for
the more broadly applicable requirements of section 553 (b) - (e). The
protections of the former scheme do not, for example, apply to rulemaking relating to grants made exclusively to private parties or
organizations. Moreover, Circular A-85 fails to assure a very large
number of "interested" or "affected" persons notice of, or an adequate
opportunity to participate in, rulemaking of the type covered by that
document for two reasons. In the first place, the document assumes
that the procedure contained therein will only apply to that rulemaking
"significant enough to be put through the consultation arrangements,"
leaving it to the discretion of the agencies to decide which rulemaking
is significant. The BOB effort does not even supply a standard to
measure what is to be considered "significant" for this purpose. Secondly, the Circularin question does not assure many interested persons
notice and an opportunity to participate in the regulation making
within its terms. Rather, it provides notice and a chance to comment
only to certain state and local government associations and, through
them, to their members. As the ultimate beneficiaries of particular
federal programs granting aid to state and local governments, many
classes or groups of citizens have a vital interest in regulations relating
to these programs. Their interests, on occasion, may be different from,
or even in opposition to, the interests of the political heads of state and
local governments whose participation in rulemaking is sought to be
protected by this scheme. Yet interested citizens are not assured
advance notice or an opportunity to participate in such rulemaking
relating to federal grants by BOB Circular A-85.
In the end, it must be reiterated that the exemption for "public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" results in a situation in
which interested persons are frequently denied notice of, and an adequate opportunity to participate in, rulemaking of concern to them.
To the extent this occurs in any case without a justification sufficient
to warrant that result, it should not be tolerated. As noted previously,
the reasons supporting the section 553(b)-(e) requirements for public
participation in rulemaking are very compelling. The potential damage
to sound government policy formulation and private rights is great in
any case where such participation is not assured. The scope and importance of the subsection (a) (2) exemptions, and the reasons advanced
for their existence must, therefore, be examined with special care.
35 Id. § 5(c).
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IV. THE SECTION 553 (a) (2) EXEMPTIONS: THEIR
SCOPE AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE

A. Generally
A few general comments should be made about the linguistic form
in which the subsection (a) (2) exemptions are cast. By their terms,
these exclusions only apply "to the extent that there is involved" rulemaking that is related to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." The legislative history emphasizes the "to the extent"
language, stating that these exemptions "apply only 'to the extent' that
the excepted subject matter is clearly and directly involved." 3 This
suggests that where an agency makes some rules coming within the
introductory exemptions and some rules that do not, it may ignore the
procedures of subsections 553(b)-(e) in the former cases but must
follow them in the latter cases. Even a single scheme of proposed
regulations must abide by this principle if it is practically divisible into
particular provisions which involve excluded functions and ones that
do not. In the report of the Senate Committee on the bill that was to
become the Administrative Procedure Act, the Committee stated that:
[I]t has avoided the mistake of attempting to oversimplify
the measure. It has therefore not hesitated to state functional classifications and exceptions where those could be
rested upon firm grounds. In so doing, it has been the undeviating policy to deal with types of functions as such and
in no case with administrative agencies by name. Thus
certain war and defense functions are exempted, but not the
War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other
functions.37
Every federal agency is exempted from the usual section 553
requirements to the extent that they perform the listed functions.
Drafters of the statute stated that "[w] here one agency has shown that
some particular operation should be exempted from any particular
requirement, the same function in all agencies has been exempted." 38
Moreover, the purpose or effect of the rules relating to any of the
excepted subjects is irrelevant since all such regulation making is excepted from section 553 by subsection (a) (2). Similarly, the type or
quantity of public property involved, or the use to which it is put, and
the subject or reason for the loans, grants, benefits, or contracts are
also immaterial for purposes of this all-encompassing exemption.
3 S. Doe. No. 248, at 257. See also id. 199.
37
8

Id. 191.
Id. 250.
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On the other hand, rulemaking is arguably not exempt under subsection (a) (2) unless it "directly" or "clearly and directly" relates to
the excluded subject matter.3 9 This wording suggests that rulemaking
only indirectly or tangentially related to the exempted subjects is not
to be treated as within the exclusions, and that unclear, close, or
doubtful cases should be treated as outside the exemption. Although
the lack of the emphatic word "clearly" in the Senate Report somewhat
dilutes this argument, there are strong reasons to construe the introductory exceptions narrowly. Most important is the fact that the subsection (a) (2) exclusions are in the form of broad, unqualified
exceptions to provisions implementing a very important general
governmental policy favoring public participation in rulemaking, and
those usually operative provisions individually contain special detailed
exemptions for peculiar cases. Moreover, a principal reason for the
enactment of the APA was to secure some standardization of administrative procedure. ° Exceptions from any of its provisions should,
therefore, usually be construed narrowly in order to achieve that result.
Nevertheless, the language of the section 553 (a) (2) exemptions
is very broad. Not only are the listed subjects that are excluded
specified in terms easily susceptible to wide application, but to be
exempted the rulemaking in question must only involve "a matter relating to" the specified subjects. An attempt to minimize the significance of the "relating to" language in subsection (a) (2) of the statute
can be made by arguing that there is little if any difference between
rulemaking where there is "involved" a certain stipulated matter and
rulemaking where there is "involved a matter relating to" that stipulated matter. Since there is ordinarily a difference in meaning between these phrases, and the inclusion of the phrase "relating to" in
subsection (a) (2) is unnecessary except as a contrast to the subsection
in which it is omitted, a conclusion that the usage only constitutes a
choice of style and does not affect content seems difficult to accept.
The following discussion will attempt to state the main thrust of
each of the section 553 (a) (2) exemptions, and provide some illustrative examples of rulemaking they are deemed to exclude. 4' An assess39 Id. 199, 257. "Directly" is the language from the Senate Report on the APA,
and "clearly and directly" from the House Report.
40 McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in FEDERAL
ADMIISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMiINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 22 (G. Warren

ed. 1947). See also S. Doc. No. 248, at 187, 249.
41 Data with respect to the way in which administrators actually construe these
exemptions in their every day affairs has been obtained from the survey questionnaire
distributed as part of this study to all federal agencies. One question asked was:
engage in that is exempted
What rulemaking does your department or agency
5

from the requirements of §§ 553(b)-(e) by §§ 5 3(a) (1)-(2) ? Be as specific
as possible by listing the particular programs you administer whose rulemaking

is exempt, and for each such program the particular part or parts of
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ment will also be made of the importance of the rulemaking excluded
by subsection (a) (2) from the usual requirements of section 553, and
the urgency and care with which these exemptions must be examined
in order to ascertain whether they are justified.
No attempt will be made in the following discussion to furnish
any mutually exclusive definition of each of the several terms "public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" used in section 553
(a) (2). Rather, as noted above, the main thrust of each term as
commonly understood in everyday government parlance will be described. There are two reasons why no effort will be made to delineate
precisely each term from every other term. First, such an effort seems
unnecessary for present purposes. If rulemaking comes within the
ambit of any one of these terms, it is exempt from usual rulemaking
procedures under subsection (a) (2). Second, five neat and mutually
exclusive categories cannot easily be drawn from the above terms.
Upon close examination, each of them overlaps at some point with
one or more of the other of these exemptions. A particular instance
or class of rulemaking may well fit within two, three, or even more
of the above categories. Many agencies acknowledged this overlap between the terms "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts"
in responses to the survey prepared for this study. A very large number of agencies listed rulemaking which they considered to be exempted from section 553 by subsection (a) (2) as fitting within two
or more of the terms listed in that exclusion.4
B. Public Property
Rulemaking involving any "matter relating to . . . public prop-

erty" is the first section 553 (a) (2) exemption of concern to this study.
§§ 553(a) (1)-(2) under which it is exempted. Where some rulemaking for a
particular program is exempt and some not, indicate which kinds of rulemaking for that program are exempt and which kinds are not. Very briefly
describe the purpose of each such exempted or partially-exempted program
and provide citations to the statutes under which it is administered.
Most of the illustrations of exempted rulemaking used in the following section are
drawn from the responses to this questionnaire.
42 The extent to which the terms used in subsection (a) (2) may overlap can best
be understood by the following examples. A loan of federal funds might be deemed
to involve "public property" as well as "loans" because the money being loaned is property of the national government. The same may be true of grants of federal monies
and benefits paid out of governmental resources. A loan also may be considered
within the "contracts" exemption because the government lends money in consideration
of the borrower's promise to return it. The same may be said of grants because the
United States usually gives them on certain conditions which the grantee accepts
when he voluntarily takes and uses the grant. A benefit might also be deemed to fit
within the "contracts" exemption as well as that for "benefits" when it is given because
of previous financial contributions which were made with the understanding that
subsequent benefits would be paid. Similarly, rulemaking relating to "grants" and
rulemaking relating to "benefits" may overlap. Aside from any initial difficulties in
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The 1947 Attorney General's Manual on Administrative Procedure
stated that this exclusion "embraces rules issued by any agency with respect to real or personal property owned by the United States or by any
agency of the United States..

. . The term 'public property' includes

property held by the United States in trust or as guardian; e.g., Indian
property." " The legislative history of the APA directly supports this
assumption.4" Consequently, the term "public property" would seem
to have a broad content, exempting from section 553 rules relating to
any form of property held by the United States in almost any capacity.
Although an argument has been made that the "public property"
exemption only applies to property held by the United States in a
"proprietary" capacity, 45 such a position has very little to recommend it.
Aside from the difficulty in distinguishing a "proprietary" capacity
from other capacities because the content of that term is illusory at
best,4" neither the language nor legislative history of the Act support
any such limitation. The little evidence mustered to support this view
can be easily explained on grounds other than an intent to achieve
47

that result.

The areas into which it has been argued that the "public property"
exemption should reach are considerably more varied than one might
expect. For example, a question arose over whether regulations concerning wild birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act were subject
to what is now section 553; that is, were wild birds "public property"
so that regulations relating to them were exempt from the usual rulemaking requirements? After noting that at common law wild animals
are the property of the state in which they are found, the Department
of Interior in a memorandum opinion stated:
As have been shown, the cases which speak of title to
or ownership of wild animals or birds placed the title or
distinguishing those terms, the United States frequently gives grants to the states to
finance benefit programs as, for example, in the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program. Federal rulemaking relating to that program may well relate both
to "grants" and "benefits" since the benefits ultimately paid to the recipients under the
program may well be considered federal benefits for purposes of § 553 (a) (2).
43

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL

27.

44 S. Doc. No. 248, at 257.
45 Wheatley, A Study of Administrative Procedures-TheDepartment of Interior,
43 GEo. L.J. 166, 177-80 (1955). The floor manager of the APA in the House stated
that "the exemption of proprietary matters is included because in those cases the
Government is in the position of an individual citizen and is concerned with its own
property, funds, or contracts." S. Doc. No. 248, at 358. See also id. 199 (stating that
the § 553(a) (2) exemptions deal with "proprietary matters").
46 Proprietary is defined as "held as the property of a private owner; relating or
belonging to a proprietor." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1819
(1966). See also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

47 The legislative history relied on was undoubtedly intended to constitute simply

an explanation of why the public property exclusion was included, or to serve as a

shorthand means of designating these exclusions, and was in no way intended as a
limitation upon them.
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ownership in the states, not in the Federal Government. The
exception of "public property" from the purview of [APA]
section 4 extends only to property of the United States.
Consequently, the exception would not cover rules regulating
the taking of wild game on lands other than those of the
Government.48
The Post Office has also been very much involved with the "public
property" exemption. In Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield,49 plaintiff challenged an increase in postal rates. One of his
grounds for the suit was that the Interstate Commerce Commission
had not held a hearing in conformance with usual procedures prior to
giving its required consent to the postal rate increase. The court
replied that "the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act . . . § 4 . . . do not apply, as mail rates are within the second

exception, 'any matter relating to agency management or personnel or
to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.' " " While the
court was not clear as to which of the particular exceptions in section
553 (a) (2) applied to the setting of mail rates, it was probably referring to the "public property" exemption. Many cases have suggested
that the United States has a "property right" and a "proprietary interest" in the postal service. 51
The cases which would support such a theory could be distinguished from the present question because they were concerned with
the reach of federal power to protect, foster, and regulate the postal
system rather than the extent to which postal authorities were exempted
from the usual public rulemaking requirements. Nevertheless, distinctions of this kind seem to be considered irrelevant. At the time
of the APA's adoption the Assistant Solicitor General of the United
States informed the Solicitor of the Post Office Department that:
I have noted the judicial decisions cited in your letter
and which emphasize the proprietary interest of the Federal
4s M-34864 to the Director, Fish and Wildlife Service (Feb. 18, 1947), quoted in
Wheatley, A Study of Administrative Procedures-The Department of the Interior,

43 GEo. L.J. 166, 177 (1955).
49116 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1953).
50 Id. 75.
51

See generally Delany, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Post

Office Department, in FFDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES 200-03 (G. Warren ed. 1947) (citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,
583 (1895)) ; Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 169 (1845) ; Electric Bond
and Share Co. v. S.E.C., 92 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Boeing Air Transport v. Farley,
75 F2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 219 F. 427 (8th
Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 215 F. 56 (4th Cir. 1914) ;
Cushman, National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution,4 MINN.
L. REv. 402 (1920) ; Note, Legislation, the Expanding Postal Power, 38 COLUM. L.
REv. 474, 478 (1938)). See also STAFF OF HoUSE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
85TH

CONG.,

1ST

SESS.,

SURVEY

AND

STUDY

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL AGENCIES
[hereinafter cited as 1957 HousE STUDY].

ORGANIZATION,

861-63 (Comm. Print 1957)
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Government in the postal system. It is well known that the
United States owns the post office properties and facilities,
and that the postal deficits are met by appropriated funds.
I concur in your opinion that rules issued by the Postmaster
General to prescribe the rates, zones, weight limits, and similar conditions upon which mail service is rendered to the
public, involve only matters relating to public property, and
are accordingly exempt from the provisions
of Section 4 of
52
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Further clarification of the extent of the meaning of "public property" can be gleaned from the Attorney General'sManual. The Manual
states, by way of example, that under the exemption for "public property" rulemaking that relates to
the public domain, i.e., the sale or lease of public lands or of
mineral, timber or grazing rights in such lands, is exempt
from the requirements of section 4. The exemption extends,
for example, to rules issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority in relation to the management of its properties, and
by the Maritime Commission with respect to ships owned
by the United States.5"
Some other examples of rulemaking deemed exempt from section 553
by the "public property" provision include rulemaking undertaken by
the General Services Administration relating to the management and
use of public buildings, surplus federal property, and stockpiled materials; rulemaking undertaken by the Department of Agriculture relating to the use and disposition of farm surplus commodities and the
national forest system lands; rulemaking undertaken by the Department
of the Interior relating to the use of the National Parks; and rulemaking undertaken by the Department of Transportation relating to
the use and occupancy of the national capital airports.
The subject matter removed from usual rulemaking requirements
by this provision is staggering in size both absolutely and in relation
to our national resources. Consider the following data with regard
to the different types, quantities, and values of federal property, the
making of rules in relation to which is excluded from usual requirements for advance notice and public participation. On June 30, 1966,
the federal government owned a total of $347 billion in real and
personal property which was controlled by various agencies. Of this
amount, $102.6 billion represents the estimated value of real property
in the possession of the United States.5" Federal land holdings
52 Delany, mipra note 51, at 202.
OATroN y GENEaA'S MANUAL 27.
64 STAFF OF HOUSE COmm. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FEDERAL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY INVENTORY REPORT (CIVILIAN AND MILITARY)

OF THE UNITED

STATES

GOVERNMENT

COVERING ITS

PROPERTIES LOCATED IN
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amounted to a total of 764,762,000 acres representing 33.7% of the
total land area of the country. They constituted as high a percentage
of total area as 97%, 86%, 67%, and 64% in Alaska, Nevada, Utah,
and Idaho respectively.55 In addition, the federal government owned
some 423,634 buildings containing a total of about 2.5 billion square
feet of space." The remaining portion of federal property consisted
of personalty holdings of all kinds including machinery and equipment,
commodities, materials and supplies, and accounts and loans receivable,
which were valued at $244.4 billion. Of this, $3.4 billion represented
57
the value of commodities for sale by the national government.
The "public property" of the United States can be roughly classified on a functional use basis. The following table shows the primary
breakdown on this basis as of June 30, 1966.5s
TABLE

A

Functional Use of "Public Property" as of June 30, 1966
National Defense Purposes
International Affairs & Finance
General Government Purposes
Agriculture & Agricultural Resources
Commerce and Transportation
Education
Housing & Community Development
Space Research & Technology
Veterans' Benefits & Services
Health, Labor & Welfare

$208.5
26.4
22.6
12.8
11.2
5.7
4.6
3.8
3.4
798.0

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
million

As the above table clearly indicates, the impact on the daily lives of
millions of Americans from regulations governing the management,
use, and disposition of these vast governmental assets is enormous.
C. Loans
The exemption for rulemaking involving matters relating to
"loans" covers a very wide spectrum of government policy-making.
The term "loan" covers "something lent for the borrower's temporary
use on condition that it or its equivalent be returned." 11 "Loan"
covers an "advance of money with an absolute promise to repay," a
THE

UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE

30, 1966, at 11 (Comm. Print 1966)

cited as PROPERTY IN ENToRY REPORT].
6 1968 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATISTICAL ABsmAcT].

194

[hereinafter cited as

5

6 PROPERTY INVENTORY REPORT 247.
5 Id. 11.
68 Id. 12-13.

[hereinafter

61) WEsTERs TanmD NEmv INTERNATioNAL DICTIONARY 1326 (1966).
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"[b] ailment without reward, consisting of the delivery of an article by
the owner to another person . . . and returned either in specie or

in kind," and may either be with or without interest or other similar
charge payable to the lender by the borrower."0
Two examples of how the "loans" exception would operate in
practice will illustrate its breadth. It seems obvious that this exception
would make the rulemaking requirements of section 553 inapplicable to
the usual functions of government lending agencies, 6 including their
programs which seek to guarantee loans, "since they are matters relating to public loans." ' Not surprising then is the holding in Barrington Manor Apartments Corp. v. United States.6" Plaintiff alleged
that a Federal Housing Administration regulation, providing that a
one per cent prepayment penalty would be levied on all mortgages held
by that agency in cases where they were paid before due, was invalid
since it was not adopted in accordance with the rulemaking requirements of section 553. The court rejected this argument because the
lending functions conferred on the FHA by the statute under which
the regulation was promulgated were excluded from those requirements
by the operation of section 553 (a) (2) .64
Although the above example was a fairly clear case, another illustration demonstrates the extent to which a regulation need only "relate
to" loans made by the government to be considered within the subsection (a) (2) exemption. Stroud v. Benson6 involved the question
whether an order of the Secretary of Agriculture requiring identification
of varieties of tobacco on the auction warehouse floor was a rule
subject to the procedures of section 553. The Secretary issued an
order requiring such identification without prior notice or public participation, on the grounds that it was "a matter relating to" the loan
and price support program for tobacco. The court affirmed the Secretary's judgment and justified the relationship because
it has been found as a fact that failure to identify the discount
varieties on the warehouse floor has and will tend to depress
the tobacco market. A depression of the open market price
6
0 BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1085 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
61 Reich, Ridemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in FEDERAL AD-

mINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

498 (G. Warren

ed. 1947).
62

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANuAL, supra note 11, at 27.
63392 F2d 224 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
64 Id. 227. The court cited Grymes Hill Manor Estates v. United States, 373
F.2d 920, 923 (Ct. Cl. 1967) for the same proposition. That case also held that the
function of the F.H.A. pursuant to the statute under which the regulation was promulgated was exempted from the § 553 requirements by subsection (a) (2). The
opinion is not explicit as to which of the (a) (2) exemptions was involved, but it may
be implied that the court was referring to the term "loans."
65155 F. Supp. 482 (E.D.N.C. 1957).
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below the level of the support price would ultimately result in
the increase of government loans and consequently government loan stocks. The instant order is directly related to this
contingency. 6
This case illustrates the very broad possibilities of an exemption
couched in terms of "a matter relating to . . . public . . . loans."
The very great variety and quantity of important government
rulemaking activities exempted by the "loans" language from the
requirements of section 553 can best be appreciated by enumerating
some of those programs to which it applies. The Attorney General's
Manual states that this exemption applies to "rules issued with respect
to loans by such agencies as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Commodity Credit Corporation, and the Farm Credit Administration. It also exempts rules relating to guarantees of loans, such
as are made by the Federal Housing Authority and the Veteran's
Administration, since they are matters relating to public loans." "
Other specific rulemaking deemed exempt from the usual notice and
public participation requirements of section 553 because it relates to
"loans" includes rulemaking by: (1) the Department of Transportation
involving loans to assist financing, acquisition of, or capital improvements to, urban mass transportation systems; (2) the Small Business
Administration involving loans to state and local development companies, economic opportunity loans, business loans, and disaster loans;
(3) the Department of Health, Education and Welfare involving loans
under the National Defense Education Act; (4) the Department of
Agriculture relating to loans in the price support programs, loans for
rural electric and telephone systems, loans for farm operating needs,
farm ownership loans, and soil and water conservation loans; and
(5) the Department of Housing and Urban Development relating to
loans to finance low and moderate income housing, loans to assist
rehabilitation of housing in urban renewal areas, and loans for rental
housing for senior citizens. Of course, while the above listing includes
some of the more important areas, it is in no way exhaustive for any
one agency or all agencies.
To get an idea in economic terms of the size, diversity, and importance of the national government's loan operations, and the extent
to which they are a significant factor in our economy and lives, consider the following data. In 1968, $57.2 billion in direct federal loans
and $108.1 billion in guaranteed federal loans were outstanding. s The
same year, $25.2 billion in new direct federal loans and $21.9 billion in
6 Id. 490.
67ATTORNEY GENaRaj's MANUAL, supra note 11, at 27.
8sU.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, SPEcIAL ANALYsIs, BUDGET OF THE UMTn

STATES, FIscAL YEAR 1970, at 62 [hereinafter cited as SPEcIA. A. ALYsIs].
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new guaranteed federal loans were made.6 9 In 1968, the Bureau of
the Budget projected that the amount of outstanding guaranteed and
insured loans would increase by some $12.7 billion in 1969 and by a
record $20.6 billion in 1970.7o By the end of 1970, $190.6 billion in
loans directly made or guaranteed by the United States will be outstanding. 7 ' Excluding foreign loans, direct loans made by the United
States in 1966 were broken down into the following functional categories and amounts: 72
TABLE

B

Direct Loans by the United
Category of Use
Agriculture
Education
Homeowners
Industry
States, territories, etc.
Financial institutions
Other loans

States in 1966
Amount
$7.9 billion
3.1 billion
3.0 billion
978.2 million
855.8 million
1.9 million
675.8 million

In important industries like housing and agriculture federal loans or
guarantees of private loans account for an enormous part of the credit
available for financing such activities.
The above data make it clear that direct federal loans and federal
guarantees of private loans play a very large and vital role in our
national government's efforts to (1) improve housing and encourage
homeownership, (2) develop agriculture and other natural resources,
(3) promote business, especially exports, transportation, and small
business generally, (4) redevelop communities and regions, and (5) aid
higher education.7" Consequently, the section 553 (a) (2) exemption
relating to "loans" excludes from the usual requirements of notice and
public participation rulemaking having a vital and enormous impact on
the public at large, and specifically bearing on many of the most pressing domestic problems facing our nation.
D. Grants
The exemption for rulemaking related to "grants" principally refers to a situation in which the government gives something to a
recipient, such as money or land, to enable him to do a particular thing.
The main thrust of the "grants" exclusion is toward cases where the
United States makes a gift of property on the condition that the re69 Id. 57.
70 Id. 63.
71 Id. 61.
72 PROPERTY INVENTORY REPORT

73 SPEcIAL ANALYSIS

54.
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cipient use it or its proceeds to achieve a specific object. As used in
section 553 (a) (2), "grants" covers all "subsidy programs" and
"grants-in-aid programs under which the Federal Government makes
payments to state and local governments" and private individuals and
entities.74 The subject or object of the grant and its terms and conditions are irrelevant.
The number of such grant programs is very large and their objects
numerous, as the following diverse examples will illustrate. The
Department of Labor administers grants seeking to secure vocational
rehabilitation for migrant workers, and grants for the administration
of unemployment insurance and employment service programs. The
operation and construction of ships and dissemination of technological
information throughout American business are the subjects of grants
by the Department of Commerce. Much highway construction results
from grants made by the Department of Transportation. The Department of Agriculture supports through grants such diverse programs as
those involving school meals, agricultural conservation, and community
water and sewer systems. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare makes various kinds of grants to aid the construction and
equipment of elementary, secondary, and other educational institutions,
as well as to support health related research, the construction of health
related facilities, child welfare services, vocational rehabilitation services,
and special services for care of the aged and mentally retarded. Among
their many grant programs, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development makes grants for urban renewal, the Office of Economic
Opportunity grants to support legal services for the poor, and the
Department of Interior grants to control water pollution.
The enormous significance of the exemption for rulemaking relating to "grants" from the usual requirements of section 553 can be
further appreciated by an examination of the extent of our national
government's grant programs. Grants-in-aid to state and local governments comprise the overwhelming bulk of federal grants. In 1970
it is estimated that such grants to state and local governments will
of total federal aid received
reach $24.7 billion, accounting for 99
by those entities in that year. Grants will then account for almost 18%
of state and local revenues, 7- and an estimated 24% of federal expenditures on civilian domestic programs.7 6
Functionally speaking, federal grants to state and local governments will break down in the following way during the next fiscal
year: agriculture and agricultural resources 4%o; natural resources 3%o;
74

AToRNEY GENERA's MANUAL, supra note 11, at 27-28.
SPEcAL AxALYsis 203.
76 Id. 208.
75
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commerce and transportation 22%; community development and housing 11 %; education and manpower 187o; health and welfare 40%; and
other 2%. "The cumulative effect of the tremendous increases in
human investment grants in the 1960-70 period will be to place the
principal emphasis of federal aid . . . on health and welfare activities-

as well as give added impetus to education and manpower, and community development and housing efforts. In 1970, these programs
will account for 69% of total estimated aid payments." The rising
tide of federal grants activities in the areas of human investment can
best be depicted by noting that between 1964 and 1970 annual federal
grants for health and welfare purposes will rise some $6.3 billion or
168%; for education and manpower purposes by $3.5 billion or 364%;
and for community development and housing purposes by $2.3 billion
or 5467o.7 On the basis of these facts it is clear that rulemaking
relating to "grants" by the national government has an enormous and
vital effect on the daily lives of tens of millions of Americans.
E. Benefits
As used in section 553 (a) (2) the term "benefits" mainly refers
to programs under which the national government makes payments in
money or kind to persons in consideration of previous contributions
paid to, or in some cases services rendered to, the United States. In
a few situations the payments are made merely because of the individual's status. Cash benefits are usually paid from government
trust funds, and, unlike grant money, may normally be expended in any
way and for any purpose the recipient desires.
The "benefits" exclusion has a very broad scope and has been
deemed to cover rulemaking relating to a great variety of programs.
More specifically, this exemption applies to rulemaking relating to
pensions, medical care, and other similar services provided to veterans
by the Veterans' Administration, and to all rulemaking relating to
old age, survivors, disability, and health insurance payments made
under the Social Security Act. 78

The exclusion also covers rulemaking

relating to the social insurance programs administered for employees
of railroads by the Railroad Retirement Board, the social insurance
programs for federal employees administered by the Civil Service Commission, and the federal-state unemployment insurance program whose
monies are administered by the Department of Labor. Federal rulemaking relating to federally financed, state administered, federal-state
assistance programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
may also be considered covered by this exemption as well as that
77 Id. 207.
.s MANUAi,
78 See ATTORNEY GENERAm

supra note 11, at 28
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for "grants."
Federal outlays for cash benefit programs totaled $40 billion in
1968, an amount equivalent to about five per cent of the Gross National
Product. Cash benefits program expenditures are expected to reach
about $49 billion in 1970. The total amount spent on cash benefit
programs have comprised about one-fourth of all federal expenditures
for all purposes in each year since 1961. 79 Cash benefit programs may
be categorized roughly into two groups--one consisting of income
replacement benefit programs, and another of income support programs.
Some $42.5 billion in federal outlays will be made in 1970 for income
replacement benefit programs providing protection against loss of earnings due to retirement, disability, death of the breadwinner, and unemployment. Of this amount, about $36.5 billion will be from accounts
funded in part by employer and/or employee contributions to which
over fifty million Americans contribute. In 1969, benefits from the
above income replacement programs will be paid to approximately 18
million people."0 Federal benefit outlays in the income support programs which base benefits on current needs will amount to $5.9 billion
by 1970, and will reach almost 12.4 million recipients."' Aid to
Families with Dependent Children is one of the best known of these
programs.
The cash benefit programs are administered by a small group of
governmental units as the following table will show:
TABLE C

Governmental Units Administering the
Cash Benefit Programs
Governmental Unit
Department of Health, Education & Welfare
Veterans' Administration
Department of Labor
Department of Defense
Civil Service Commission
Railroad Retirement Board

Amount
$33.3 billion
5.5 billion
2.9 billion
2.7 billion
2.4 billion
1.6 billion

70 SPEcrAL ANALYsis 174-75. Some of this money, and some of the money in the
following figures with regard to "benefits," represents grant payments to the states
for benefit programs they will administer. Consequently those funds might better be
viewed as "grants" rather than "benefits," even though they may result in the payment
of federally financed benefits. However, the overwhelming bulk of the money referred
to in the accompanying figures are benefit payments made directly by the United

States. See id. 187 (HEW "Public Assistance" category).

SOld. 175, 179-80; STATisTicAL ABsmAcT 476. The survivors and disability
programs in this category will benefit some 7.8 million beneficiaries and 4.9 million
beneficiaries respectively; and unemployment payments will aid about 5.3 million
individuals.
81
SPEcrL ANALYsIs 182.
82Id. 187.
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In addition to all of the above federal benefit programs providing cash
benefits which the recipient is free to use as he chooses, outlays in
federal programs providing benefits in kind will be in excess of $5
billion by 1970,13 and will provide benefits for many millions of persons." It is rulemaking related to these programs, involving billions
of dollars and directly affecting tens of millions of Americans, that is
removed from the mandatory notice and public participation requirement of section 553 by the term "benefits" in subsection (a) (2).
F. Contracts
The last section 553 (a) (2) exemption to be considered is that
for "public .

.

. contracts."

The main thrust of the "contracts" ex-

emption seems to be toward government procurement of real or personal property and services. The legislative history of the Act does
cast some doubt as to whether "rulemaking relating to public .
contracts" includes one area, vitally important to a great many peoplethat of "minimum wage determinations of the Department of Labor in
connection with public contracts." ' However, in light of all the
evidence and the unqualified sweeping language of the exemption those
determinations must be deemed within that exclusion. 6 In this connection it should be noted that the Attorney General's Manual unequivocally states that "the exemption extends to wage determinations
made by the Labor Department under the Davis Bacon Act and the
Walsh Healy Act, as conditions to construction and procurement
contracts entered into by the Federal Government." 87
The "contracts" exemption clearly has a very wide scope. In
addition to General Services Administration rulemaking relating to
contracts for the procurement of land, goods, and services, and to construction contracts of all kinds, the exemption applies, as do all of the
other (a) (2) exemptions, to rulemaking of that sort by every federal
93 Id.
84 Id.

186.
185.

85 Objections were made to an early draft version of the APA which exempted
"any matter relating to . . . public property or contracts" on the grounds that the
§ 4 rulemaking procedures "should not be applied to minimum wage determinations of
the Department of Labor in connection with public contracts." The reaction to the
criticism was to suggest that the exemption now found in § 553(b) (B) for situations
in which the usual procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest," "amply providels] for proper exemptions," rather than to state what
otherwise would seem obvious: the term "contracts" completely and unqualifiedly
exempted Department of Labor wage determinations from § 4. S. Doc. No. 248, vupra
note 2, at 18.
86
See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 28, quoted in text accompanying note 87
infra; Reich, supra note 61, at 498. Note also that the continuous practice of the
Department has been to treat such determinations as exempt. 1969 Survey, stpra
note 27 (response of the Department of Labor).
87
ATTORNEY GENERAI'S MANUAL, supra note 11, at 28 (citations omitted) (citing
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940)).
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agency. For instance, it extends to rulemaking by the Treasury
Department relating to the terms under which government securities
are issued, owned and redeemed "since securities are government contracts." 88 It also extends to regulation making for Department of
Agriculture programs such as the Cropland Adjustment Program,
Feed Grain Program, Cropland Conversion Program, Soil Bank Program, Wheat Diversion Program, Crop Insurance Program, and a
number of Commodity Credit Corporation programs. In addition, it
applies to such Health, Education and Welfare contracts as those to
establish or expand law school clinical experience programs, and those
for university research on a huge number of topics. It also, of course,
applies to rulemaking relating to the nondiscrimination in government
contracts program administered by the Department of Labor.
An idea of the significance and importance of such government
contracts, rulemaking relating to which is excluded by section 553 (a) (2)
from the usual rulemaking requirements, may be gained from the
following illustrative data. The jobs of millions of Americans are
directly and indirectly affected by the contracting activities of the
federal government. In fiscal 1969 the United States will purchase
$20.6 billion in nondefense related goods and services.8 9 Outlays
under contracts for direct, nondefense related federal public works,
which include the design and construction of new structures, major
improvements and modifications of existing structures, and in some
cases site acquisition, will reach about $2.5 billion in 1970Y0 The
total estimated cost at that time for all nonmilitary federal public works
in progress, which includes the sum of payments to be made under
contracts in process and contracts to be newly initiated, will amount
to $12.5 billion. 1
In 1967, awards were made under defense related procurement
contracts, including contracts to obtain military supplies, services, or
construction of all sorts, amounting to $44.6 billion.02 For that same
year, it was estimated that jobs for 7.4 million workers, comprising
about ten per cent of all employees in this country, was generated by
Department of Defense contracts.9 3 It should also be noted that
arrangements for the financing of the public debt of the United States,
which the Treasury treats under the "contracts" exemption, covered
$326 billion in 1967. This included $210 billion in marketable public
88 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of the Department of the Treasury).
89U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,

FIscAL YEAR 1969, at 541.
9oSpECIl ANALYSIS 221-22.

911d. 226.
9

2 STATISTICAl ABsTRACr

!3 Id. 251.
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issues . 4 Rulemaking relating to all of the above, affecting the lives
of millions of individuals in every part of this country, is removed by
the "contracts" exemption from the requirements of subsections

(b)-(e).
G. Some Conclusions With Respect to the Scope and Practical
Importance of Section 553 (a) (2) Exemptions
Even if they are strictly construed, which they seldom seem to be
in practice, the section 553(a) (2) exemptions are extraordinarily
broad and of very great significance. The language of these exemptions excludes an enormous quantity of rulemaking from the requirements of section 553. The classes of rulemaking excluded by it are
also of especially great qualitative importance to certain segments of
our society and to the public interest at large.'" The rulemaking involved has a great impact on our national effort to cure the pressing
human problems of the last half of the twentieth century. Most rulemaking excluded from section 553 by subsection (a) (2) relates to
programs, or functions, or techniques for governing, which have an
unusually large impact on the daily lives of tens of millions of Americans. Efforts to solve our urban crisis, racial problems, poverty
problems, environmental quality difficulties, and human spirit and character maladjustments have mainly been pursued through the use of
"public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
As a result, most rulemaking attempting to deal with the important
domestic problems facing our nation in this era has been conducted
without any guarantee that public participation of the kind stipulated
by section 553(b)-(e) will be allowed. As previously noted, the rulemaking procedures actually utilized in the situations currently exempted by section 553 (a) (2) are frequently much less effective to
secure adequate public participation than those found in section
553(b)-(e). The impact of this situation on the poor, city people, the
farmer, and other separable segments of our society is particularly
detrimental.
The exemptions under consideration here are especially undesirable
because they tend to insulate almost all of the rulemaking of certain
specific federal agencies against unwanted public participation. Agencies
whose rulemaking is almost entirely insulated against such mandatory
public involvement may, as entire governmental entities, completely lose
touch with the public they are to serve, and in that situation, the
public may lose any day to day ability to influence the operations of
94 Id.

394-95.

95 See Bonfield, supra note 31, at 512-20.
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such agencies. Although this does not always occur, it is nevertheless
a grave danger.
Two points deserve reiteration. First, rulemaking of the kind
exempted by subsection (a) (2) intimately affects millions of Americans in their daily lives, and is one of the most important and frequently used means by which our national government seeks to solve
our pressing social, economic, and environmental problems. As the
Senate Committee on Administrative Procedure stated when it recently
recommended modification of section 553 (a) (2),
[t] he importance of the Government's activity in this area is
now enormous, involving, as it does, tens of billions of
dollars of expenditures yearly and vast properties. The rules
regulating this activity are consequently of vital concern to
the public and it is only reasonable that it be informed and
allowed to take part when rules relating to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts are made."
Second, the exemption of rulemaking relating to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" also creates a special danger that
certain important government agencies may, as entities, become out of
touch with and unresponsive to public needs. In light of these two
points, and the many reasons favoring required opportunities for public
participation in rulemaking that were discussed in the introduction to
this paper, the reasons assigned to justify these particular exemptions
must be examined with extraordinarily great care.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS ADVANCED FOR THE "PUBLIC PROPERTY, LOANS,
GRANTS, BENEFITS, OR CONTRACTS" EXEMPTIONS

Arguments advanced to justify the exemption of the so-called
"proprietary" activities of government from usual rulemaking procedures range in character. Some are purely theoretical and historical.
Others are intensely practical. But they all deserve careful enumeration
and evaluation, for only then can it be ascertained whether they are
adequate to. justify the status quo in light of the competing policies
which favor public participation in rulemaking.
The right-privilege distinction furnishes the most frequent justification for the exemption of subsection (a) (2) rulemaking from the
procedural requirements of section 553. The theory is that no member
of the public has a "right" to use public property, receive a loan, grant,
or benefit from the government, or to make a contract with the government. Rather, these are all "privileges," and if a man does not like the
terms on which these privileges are made available to him, he can
96 S. 518 Hearings,supra note 30, at 379.
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simply refuse to accept the privileges and thereby avoid submission to
their conditions. Consequently, rulemaking relating to these subjects
should be treated differently than rulemaking relating to other government functions. This idea has been expressed in a number of ways.
An official objecting to the legislative imposition of certain procedures on his agency's activities, including rulemaking of the sort
involved here, stated that "the parties affected [by the Bureau of
Reclamation's activities]

.

.

.

voluntarily submit to regulations in

order to gain certain privileges." 7 The Department of Commerce
thought that following the usual procedures for rulemaking involving
the "proprietary functions" appeared to be "unduly burdensome, particularly where the subject matter does not involve a right of the
private parties concerned, but rather bestowal upon them of such
benefits as loans, grants, etc." " Somewhat differently stated-so as
to include the idea that a person may avoid complying with subsection
(a) (2) rules promulgated in the isolation of government bureaucracy
by not dealing with the government- is the version supplied by the
General Services Administration a number of years ago:
The rulemaking which is presently subject to section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act is rulemaking of the true
"regulatory" type; i.e., rulemaking that has a direct impact
upon industries or the public which have no choice but to be
regulated in the public interest. Such rulemaking affects all
members of the public who engage in the regulated activity,
whether they are dealing with the Government or with other
members of the public, while GSA's regulations apply, in general, only to Government agencies and those members of the
public who choose to deal with the Government by furnishing
supplies or services, leasing space, buying surplus property,
etc. Accordingly, since those affected may extricate themselves of their own volition from the impact of GSA regulations by not dealing with the Government, due process does
not require such safeguards as are provided in section 4 of
the redraft of S. 1663 [which eliminates the subsection
(a) (2) exemptions] for their protection. 9
The "right-privilege," "avoidable conditions" argument is concerned with the relationship between the subject matter of the exempted category and the recipient. Another distinction, this one
between the proprietary and nonproprietary functions of the Government, deals more broadly with the nature of the governmental activity
071941 Hearings, supra note 17, at 689 (statement of Commissioner of Reclamation).
!98S.1663 Hearings,supra note 30, at 311.
99 Id. 522. See id. at 427.

1970]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING

involved; yet it is often used in close conjunction with the "rightprivilege" argument to justify the current subsection (a) (2) exemptions. It is argued that the procedures contained in section 553 should
not be applied to rulemaking involving the subjects listed in subsection
(a) (2) because when government exercises these functions it is acting
in a "proprietary" capacity.'00 Consequently, in that situation the
Government should be treated as if it were a business or private person
handling private money or affairs. The floor manager of the APA
in the House argued strongly for this interpretation during the debate
on that bill.1" 1 Public participation in rulemaking relating to these
kinds of situations is deemed to be unnecessary since if a businessman
were carrying on the same activities, a private person would have no
right to participate in his decision-making process. 10 2 Furthermore,
it has been asserted that "freeing functions of a proprietary nature, in
order to improve the position of the Government when it is operating
in an area and along lines similar to a business enterprise, reflects the intentional and traditional position of the Congress in this connection." 103
The above arguments should not be sufficient to justify the current
section 553 (a) (2) exemptions. In the first place, the law is currently
in the process of reevaluating the "right-privilege," "avoidable conditions" distinction as a ground upon which to base legal judgments regarding the propriety of governmental action.'" The notion that a
government agency should be free to deal with people in any manner
the former pleases when "privileges" are involved-an idea which was
never the product of common sense or sound social policy-is fast disappearing both in the law, and in the public mind. Secondly, because
many people have come to depend upon such "privileges" as welfare
benefits of various kinds, social security and veterans' benefits, government guaranteed home loans, federal contracts, and public recreation
facilities, most people now consider them a part of their entitlement.
Furthermore, these people have increasingly little choice but to accept
such benefits, whether they be called "rights" or "privileges." Realis1O Id. 494 (Department of Defense).
101 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 358.
102 The Department of Defense has stated that "to publish or to admit the public to
the formulation of such a policy [regarding pricing and negotiation of contracts]
could only put the Government at serious disadvantage in the negotiation of the contracts for which the policy was intended. Certainly there is no comparable disclosure
required of private parties to Government contracts, and it would be unthinkable for
the Government, in its proprietary capacity, to participate in the formulation of the
business policies and practices of the firms with which it deals." 1957 House STUDY,
supra note 51, at 278. See also S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 279 (REA).
103 1957 House STUDY, supra note 51, at 1732 (Federal Housing Administration).
104 See, e.g., Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966) ; O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443
(1966) ; Van Alystyne, The Demise of the Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAgv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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tically, the conditions imposed on recipients of such grants, benefits, or
public contracts, for example, frequently cannot be avoided; in the
world as it actually is, most people are in no position to refuse the
"privilege" to which the strings are attached.
Finally and most important, both the "right-privilege" and the
"proprietary-nonproprietary" distinctions are meaningless in this context because they are not tools with which the problem at hand can be
realistically analyzed and evaluated. Rather, they are screens which
enable the user to avoid the hard work of investigating the real problem involved. To say that public participation is not required in rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" because they involve "privileges" or "proprietary" matters is to
declare a result without giving any relevant reason for it. The fact
that a certain construction firm has no "right" to contract with the
Government, or that when the Government enters into such a contract
it is acting in a "proprietary" capacity, or that the firm need not apply
for such a "privilege" if it does not like the rules governing those
contracts, has little to do with answering the question under examination. Those labels do not help a decision-maker to decide intelligently whether application of section 553 procedures to rulemaking
involving "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" is in
fact undesirable. That conclusion can be reached only after a careful
examination of the consequences flowing from an application of section
553 procedures to such cases; and it can be justified only if the specific
advantages of public participation in those cases are outweighed by the
specific disadvantages that would flow from such a requirement.
As previously noted, the sound administration of government demands fully informed decision-makers. Presumably we intend all
aspects of governmental activity to be administered wisely including
those that can be labeled "proprietary" and those that involve the dispensing of "privileges." Similarly, our dedication to responsible democratic government requires that the rulemaking process be responsive
to affected citizens by allowing them to communicate effectively their
views to the relevant officials. Here, too, we presumably want citizens
to have a chance to protect their interests against administrative action
prejudicial to them in any way, whether that prejudice stems from
government action involving a "right" or a "privilege," or a "proprietary" or "nonproprietary" matter. If the (a) (2) exemptions are to
persist in the face of such important competing public policies, it should
be because of some particular undesirable consequences that might flow
from their elimination and not because an irrelevant label can be
attached to the subjects they embrace.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING

Most federal agencies making rules relating to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" take the position that the repeal
of section 553 (a) (2) would somehow harm the performance of their
responsibilities. The specific practical justifications offered to support
the exemptions in question vary. They have been gathered from
various sources, including congressional hearings, a survey prepared
for this study,' and a related survey done for the Administrative
Conference of the United States in 1968. °6
The most frequently articulated, practical justification for the subsection (a) (2) exemptions is that their elimination would cause a
greatly increased work load resulting in both delay in the performance
of the Government's everyday functions and increased costs in carrying
on those functions. The spectre of inefficient delays arises from a
sense that the bulkiness of the rulemaking task could cause the
bureaucracy to bog down if the exemptions were eliminated. The
General Services Administration has opined, for example, that "[p] ublic
participation [through rulemaking] in the management [of] property
and contracts would be so complicated and cumbersome as to seriously
impede and delay the efficient and economical conduct of the Government business." 107 Similarly, "delay in rendering services and administering benefits" was the prediction of the Veterans' Administration if subsection (a) (2) was eliminated."' 8 The Department of
Interior has asked, in this regard:
Is the public really better served through the medium of
notice of rulemaking and publication in the Federal Register
The question asked in this survey was:
From the point of view of your department or agency what disadvantages, if
any, do you see in a statute which would eliminate the general exclusions now
found in subsections 553(a)(1)-(2) and thereby make the provisions of
subsections 553(b)-(e) applicable to all rulemaking relating to those currently
excepted situations? Be as specific as possible, furnishing concrete, detailed
examples. Overly general answers will not be particularly helpful. If your
answer varies from program to program or from one type of currently
excepted rulemaking to another, please specify and explain in detail.
Despite the instructions contained in the last three sentences, most agencies responded
with general answers and did not furnish concrete, detailed examples of how the
alleged disadvantages arise in practice. The failure to present specific instances may be
indicative of the frailty of the many arguments made against modification of § 553(a) (2).
lo6 The question asked in 1968 was:
What disadvantages, if any, do you see in a statute which would eliminate
the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) as they nay apply to . . . [your
programs with a substantial impact on the poor], and thereby would make the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-553(e) applicable to all rulemaking relating to
those programs? (Assume that the several exceptions now in sections 553(b)
through (e) would remain unchanged.)
Bonfield, supra note 31, at 548.
107 1957 HousE STUDY, stpra note 51, at 1579.
108 1969 Survey, .apranote 27. See also similar comments by the same agency
in 1957 HOUSE STUDY, supra note 51, at 2060 and S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 30,
at 463.
3.05
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in every instance of the formulation of a statement of policy?
What effect would such a requirement have on the operations
of a program agency? Do we want to take the chance of
subjecting much of the informal policy making that we do
today on a daily basis to the potential of interminable delays?
Can our programs afford these delays? Even more importantly, will Congress and the public tolerate these delays?
We firmly believe that the answer to all of these questions,
when carefully analyzed, must be "no"! 109
On the issue of increased operating costs, the Farmers Home Administration has reported, for example, that elimination of these exceptions
"would cause a tremendous increase in the volume of work and operating costs" of that agency. 1 ° Even an agency seemingly unopposed
to the modification of this exemption has noted that such a change
"would, of course, substantially increase the cost of government." "
Elimination of the present exemptions is also deemed undesirable
because it would cause adherence to the procedures of section
553(b)-(e) in many cases where the public has little interest in the
rulemaking, 1 2 or is unlikely to make a significant contribution to it."1
It is alleged that frequently a rule being considered in relation to one
of the exempted subjects "is so limited in its application or so minimal
in its public impact that . . . any solicitation of comment from the
public would be completely unjustified." 114
Furthermore, if rulemaking relating to "public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts" is subjected to the requirements of
section 553(b)-(e), it is feared that the agencies involved in such
rulemaking, and those members of the public most directly affected,
would be placed in an adversary position, thereby discouraging mutual
cooperation toward finding the best solution to common problems.
1o9 S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 42.
110 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of FHA, Department of Agriculture).
See also id. (responses of Forest Service and Soil Conservation Service, Department
of Agriculture; Atomic Energy Commission (attachment to response); Veterans'
Administration) ; S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 30, at 144, 427 (Department of Agriculture and General Services Administration).
I11 Bonfield, supra note 31, at 549 & nA7 (Department of Labor).

112 See 1957 HOUSE STUDY, supra note 51, at 551 (Department of Interior, Fish
and Wildlife Service).
113 See S.1663 Hearings, supra note 30, at 177 G (Department of Treasury);
1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of Small Business Administration).
114 S.1663 Hearings, supra note 30, at 427 (General Services Administration).
On another occasion a representative of the G.S.A. stated that "public advance notice
in the Federal Register and public participation in the formulation of these rules is
too much, costs too much, takes too much time, for many rules that would not warrant
that type of effort." Transcript of the ABA Symposium on S. 1336, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 1, 1966) 109.
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The Tennessee Valley Authority has stated, for example, that their
operations would be likely to be disrupted by such a polarization.'"
The agencies also feared that repeal of subsection (a) (2) would
remove desirable flexibility in such rulemaking. The Atomic Energy
Commission complained in this regard, as an illustration, that if that
agency's rulemaking relating to contracts had to comply with section
553, it would "lessen the Commission's flexibility in dealing with the
many different kinds of contracting situations which arise." 11" A
similar argument is that elimination of these exemptions would discourage agencies from making worthwhile changes in rules because of
the more formal and particularized procedures that would be required.
The House and Senate Reports on the APA noted that "[t]he exception of proprietary matters [in section 4] is included because the principal considerations in most such cases relate to mechanics and interpretations of policy, and it is deemed wise to encourage and facilitate
the issuance of rules [on these excluded subjects] by dispensing with
all mandatory procedural requirements." 11
Section 553(a) (2) is also said to be justified on the grounds that
without it, there would be uncertainty in some cases whether public
rulemaking procedures must be followed, thus causing litigation or
encouraging the use of those procedures in situations where they would
be unwise. The Department of Defense reported, for example, that
the primary disadvantage to that agency of eliminating the broad exclusions in section 553 was "uncertainty," because the extent to which
their rulemaking fits under the more limited exemptions found within
section 553(b)-(e) was unclear. This "leads the Department of
Defense to fear a rash of litigation testing . .
of these . . . [other exemptions]." 118

.

[its] interpretation

The current exemptions are alleged to be necessary for another
reason. In some cases, section 553 procedures are said to be an insufficient means by which to assure that the relevant people participate
115 TVA said that procedures similar to those in what is now § 553 "would place
TVA and its distributors in an adversary position where the tendency would be for
each distributor to try fo gain an advantage in the formulation of the policy rather
than working with TVA and other distributors in a mutual effort to find the best
possible solution to each problem as it arises." S. 1663 Hearings,supra note 30, at 544.
The agency gave a similar response in 1968. See Bonfield, supra note 31, at 549 n.49.
See also 1957 HousE STUDY, supra note 51, at 374 (Office of Education, Department

of Health, Education and Welfare).
116 S.518 Hearings,supra note 30, at 119. See also S. 1663 Hearings, supra note
30, at 544, stating that "a large measure of the success of T.V.A. . . . attained
during the past 31 years has been due to its ability to maintain flexibility in its operations. The proposed revision [elimination of § 553 (a) (2)] would take away this
flexibility."; 1957 HousE STUDY, supra note 51, at 2060 (Veterans' Administration);
Bonfield, supra note 31, at 548 n.45.
117 S.Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 199, 247.
118 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of Department of Defense). See also id.
(response of REA, Department of Agriculture).
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adequately in rulemaking relating to the exempted subjects. Requiring
adherence to those procedures in the subsection (a) (2) situations
might, therefore, sometimes force an agency to follow two sets of
procedures in order to involve properly the right people. The Office
of Economic Opportunity has noted, for instance, that the procedures
prescribed in section 553 "would generally prove ineffective in reaching
the poor," and that they would have to be supplemented by other, more
effective procedures currently being used by OEO. 1 9
The difficulty with all of the previous general justifications for the
current section 553 (a) (2) exclusions is that they do not distinguish
rulemaking relating to these exempted categories as a class from rulemaking already subjected to the requirements of section 553(b)-(e).
Every one of the arguments just outlined could also be made with
respect to those classes of rulemaking already subjected to the usual
rulemaking procedures. The complaint that increased cost, work load,
general delay, duplication, and the like will result if the currently excepted rulemaking is required to follow section 553(b)-(e) could, for
example, also be made with respect to the run-of-the-mill regulatory
rulemaking which we have already decided should be subjected to those
provisions. The argument that required adherence to usual rulemaking
procedures in these cases will reduce needed flexibility, cause uncertainty and litigation, be a waste in many cases, and discourage needed
changes in rules, could also undoubtedly be used to support the exemption of all the currently included rulemaking. If it was worth
risking some of these possible consequences to bring that rulemaking
within the procedures contained in the statute, it is also worth risking
them to bring the rulemaking under discussion here within those requirements. There is no evidence to support the general assertion that
the deleterious consequences flowing from the inclusion of subsection
(a) (2) rulemaking within the provisions of section 553 are greater
than the similar consequences resulting from the application of that
provision to the rulemaking already subject to its terms. Furthermore,
experience with the section 553 procedures as applied to other kinds of
rulemaking also suggests that these consequences are not likely to be
as frequent, great, or detrimental in the mass of subsection (a) (2)
situations as advocates of this exemption claim.
However, agencies do encounter specific situations involving subsection (a) (2) rulemaking in which a requirement that they provide
advance notice and an opportunity to participate would be unreasonable.
For instance, although the Department of Labor does not argue that
there are any disadvantages in the elimination of section 553 (a) (2)
119 Bonfield, supra note 31, at 549 n.48. See also 1969 Survey, supra note 27
(response of the Office of Economic Opportunity) ; S. 1663 Hearings, =pranote 30, at
325 (Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
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as it applies to rulemaking of general application, it takes a different
view with respect to certain rulemaking situations of particular
application.
[T]he Davis-Bacon Act and some 45 related acts for Federal
and Federally-assisted construction contracts

.

.

..

provide

that the specifications for all such contracts shall require the
contractor to pay to his laborers and mechanics at least the
prevailing wage as determined by the Secretary of Labor.
The determinations are made by the Secretary at the request
of the contracting agency before the bids are let.
. . . [The vast sums spent on Federal and Federallyassisted construction] are influenced not only by the level of
the wages, but also by procedures which delay commencement
of the contract. The aphorism that time means money is particularly pertinent here.
• . . [A]t present the Department of Labor issues almost 26,000 prevailing wage determinations annually, averaging about 25 separate classifications of laborers and
mechanics. Each classification may include up to six separate
findings as to cash wages and fringe benefits payments. The
Department receives about 45,000 pieces of correspondence
annually in connection with the issuance of these wage determinations [which constitute rulemaking within the definition
of § 551(4)].
Application of the formal rule-making requirements of
section 4 would require some 500 to 600 notices of proposed
rulemaking to be published each week in the Federal Register.
Interested persons would have an opportunity . . . [to par-

ticipate in each case]. The processing of the submitted data,
views, and arguments could result 20in obvious delays and additional personnel and other costs.

120 S. 518 Hearings,supra note 30, at 239-40. See also 1969 Survey, supra note 27
(response of the Department of Labor). The following additional reasons are offered
for exempting wage determinations from § 553 rulemaking procedures:
1. Prospective bidders and interested labor organizations receive actual
notice either by means of direct distribution by this Department, distribution
by a parent organization, or examination of the advertisement for bids. The
constructive notice which would be given by means of the Federal Register is
not necessary.
2. Since the wage determination process is in essence a continuing one,
interested persons have an open-ended opportunity to submit written data,
views, or arguments about prevailing wage practices in a locality. An opportunity to submit such information in the case of any one determination therefore becomes almost meaningless.
3. The issued wage determination is, in effect, tentative until there is no
longer a reasonable opportunity to notify bidders of substantive changes in
its terms. Under these circumstances, a separate notice of rulemaking is
meaningless.
4. There is no need for any delay in effective date of the wage determination. The purpose of a delay in effective date is to permit persons affected
thereby to adjust to its terms. The bid submitted by a contractor represents
such an adjustment.
S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 241.
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On this basis the Department of Labor has concluded that "there
are considerable disadvantages and no corresponding advantages in the
elimination of the exemptions in section 553(a) (1)-(2) as they apply
to wage determinations under the Davis-Bacon Act and its related acts
and the Service Contract Act." 12 In this situation, it is clear that
the unusually large costs which would be imposed on the Government
by required adherence to normal rulemaking procedures far outweigh
the benefits of public participation. These costs include not only the
direct monetary cost of administering such procedures in this unusual
situation but also the likelihood of substantial, deleterious consequences
to the Government's construction program. Arguments based on the
sheer magnitude of rulemaking necessary in a particular situation have
also been made by a number of other agencies," s but few of them are
as convincing or as extraordinary as that noted above.
Similarly, there is no doubt that repeal of the (a) (2) exemptions
must not interfere with the ability of agencies to react quickly in
emergency situations, or in other situations where the proper performance of their functions requires rapid action. For example, there are
many situations in which the Department of Agriculture cannot give
advance notice of, or allow prior public participation in, its rulemaking
relating to the wheat acreage allotment or crop insurance programs.
The Department must frequently make changes in the regulations
relating to those programs on an emergency basis, "because of a flood,
other unusual weather, plant disease or something similar. In such
cases [it needs] to change the regulation and make it effective at once
without giving notice or delaying the effective date." 123 Similarly,
agencies like the Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve
Board cannot perform their intended functions properly unless they can
respond instantaneously, when necessary, to a changed economic situation by promulgating rules "related to the implementation of effective
121 1969 Survey, supranote 27.
122The 1969 survey response of the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service
indicates that compliance with §§553(b)-(e) would require it to publish in the
Federal Register "70 percent of the Forest Service Manual and Handbook, presently
consisting of approximately 30,000 pages with changes averaging 5,800 annually."
An attachment to the 1969 Survey response of the Atomic Energy Commission indicates that "at present, A.E.C. Procurement Regulations consist of approximately 860
pages and require modification about 40 times a year. Other A.E.C. manuals and
handbooks relating to contracts and property consist of approximately 1,000 pages and
are supplemented and revised about 50 times a year." See also S.518 Hearings, supra
note 30, at 70 (Department of Defense). It should be noted, however, that much
of the above would be excluded from the usual rulemaking requirements of § 553
because they are "interpretative rules" or "general statements of policy" as opposed to

"substantive rules" or "legislative rules." See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b) (A), (d)(2) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
123

1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of Production Stabilization Division,

Department of Agriculture).

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING

monetary or fiscal policy." "A Rules imposing immediately needed
safety requirements furnish another example.
There are also specific occasions involving subsection (a) (2) rulemaking in which advance public procedures of the type listed in section
553 may cause the very evil that the proposed rules are designed to
avoid. This is so, for example, in the situations just referred to relating to the implementation of an effective monetary or fiscal policy.
Advance notice in such cases may unsettle the money and credit
markets, present opportunities for deleterious speculative activities, and
"could have generally disruptive effects on financial markets and financial institutions." "' Another case involving an exempted subject in
which adherence to usual rulemaking procedures would have caused
the very evil the contemplated rule sought to avoid occurred in 1960
when the Secretary of the Interior declared a moratorium on the
acceptance of applications with respect to the public lands. The reason
for the moratorium was that a very large backlog of such applications
had accumulated while many new ones were continuously being filed.
The Department pointed out that requiring "publication in the Federal
Register of a proposed moratorium would have invited a deluge of
applications," making the situation much worse than it already was. 2 '
In addition to the above, there is another class of situations involving subsection (a) (2) rulemaking in which adherence to the usual
procedures involving advance notice and an opportunity to participate
may be deemed unreasonable. A situation occasionally arises in which
the rulemaking in question is so insignificant or minor in nature and
impact that utilization of these procedures may be a complete and
predictable waste. A rule requiring persons receiving federal loans or
grants to sign the loan or grant instrument in ink or ball point rather
than in pencil or crayon surely does not require public participationnor, of course, do purely technical amendments to an existing rule.
Similarly, if all of the information relating to the form and desirability
of a given rule is necessarily within the exclusive possession of the
national government because, for example, that information is a military
secret or otherwise privileged from disclosure, advance notice and an
opportunity to participate would be useless and a predictable waste.
The above discussion demonstrates that in certain types of cases
involving rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," adherence to usual rulemaking procedures would be
unreasonable. There are specific situations where the policies favoring
public participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the conflicting
124 S.518
25

Hearings, supra note 30, at 51, 64-65, 395, 398, 400.

Id. 395, 398, 400.
126 1d. 43.
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need to operate the Government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively,
and inexpensively. These situations, however, are a minority and
break down into a number of well-defined classes which can be dealt
with individually. They do not, therefore, constitute adequate justifications for the exemption of all rulemaking activity relating to the
excepted subjects; rather, they only suggest that suitable, narrowlydrawn exceptions be provided for these atypical cases and situations.""
Finally, an interesting special argument has been made to justify
the "contracts" exception. It has been argued that the "contracts"
exemption should be retained in the current form because:
[I]t is more appropriate to make procedural improvements
in this highly specialized field by amendments to title 41
[which deals in detail with public contracts]. The great
advantage of the Administrative Procedure Act is that it can
cut across a lot of statutes and give general rules for a lot
of agencies where you could never catch up if you were
dealing with every agency directly. But where you have one
title that already sets forth very specialized procedures, if
those are not proving adequate, then it seems to us that the
way to correct them is to amend that title.'
This argument flies in the face of the intended function of the APA
which is to achieve as much uniformity in federal administrative procedure as is reasonably possible through the use of a single comprehensive code on that subject. 9 If it is reasonably possible to obtain
such uniformity with respect to the procedural requirements relating
to most rulemaking, including that relating to contracts, an effort
should be made to do so by amending the APA.
Moreover, the above special argument supporting the "contracts"
exemption may be used merely to defer action which would modify
the present procedures utilized in rulemaking relating to public contracts. In fact, it is probably not of great consequence whether rulemaking relating to contracts is subjected to the requirements of section
553(b)-(e) directly, or indirectly by adding those same provisions to
title 41. But the implicit suggestion in the above special argument for
a section 553 contracts exemption is that contracts rulemaking should
not be subjected to the exact same kind of requirements as section
327 This was recognized, for example, in the 1969 Survey response of the Department of Agriculture's Production Stabilization Division. The response stated that the
Division would be disadvantaged if § 553 (a) (2) was eliminated because that action
might make it difficult to deal with emergency situations. But the response went on
to note: "It is true, of course, that notice and effective dates can be waived for cause,
but an exemption, we feel, would be preferable to waivers."
128 S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 334.
12 See sources cited note 40 supra.
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553(b)-(e) imposes. That is really why the subsection (a)(2) exemption for contracts should be retained, and any modifications of
rulemaking procedure in such cases be worked, if at all, under title 41.
However, the evidence uncovered in this study does not support
the need for a blanket and unqualified exemption from section 553 for
all rulemaking relating to public contracts, or, for that matter, for all
rulemaking relating to any of the other subjects listed in section
553 (a) (2). As subsequent discussion will demonstrate, a more narrowly tailored exemption can be devised to deal with the exceptional
cases of section 553(a)(2) rulemaking that need special treatment.
Consequently, no persuasive reason appears to justify a continuation
of the present unqualified and across-the-board exemption for rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
VI. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO MODIFY SEcTION 553 (a) (2)

In almost every session of Congress during this decade one or
more bills have been introduced to reform federal administrative procedure. The most important bills attempting this were S. 2335, S. 1663,
and S. 1663 (subcommittee revision) of the Eighty-eighth Congress,
and S. 518, S. 2770, and S. 2771 of the Ninetieth Congress. All of
these bills have one thing in common concerning the present exceptive
language of section 553 (a) (2); they eliminated the unqualified exclusion from section 553 for rulemaking relating to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." In its place, they substituted
varying kinds of specific and general exemptions to deal with the
problems that might arise from that action.
Before outlining the ways in which these various proposals have
sought to resolve the problem under consideration, an introductory
caveat should be stated. In their general definitional section, every
one of the above bills defined "rule" as "the whole or any part of any
agency statement of general applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy. .

.

."

130

The words

"or particular" which appear after the word "general" in the current
section 551 definition of "rule" were purposefully deleted. Rulemaking
of "particular applicability" was treated by these statutes as adjudication and, as such, was governed by those provisions of the various
acts. 3' This difference between the presently effective usage of the
130 S. 2771,

90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 551(4) (1967); S. 2770, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.

§ 551(5) (1967); S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1967); S. 2335, 88th Cong.,
§ 1001(c) (1964) ; Revised S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(c) (1964); S. 1663 88th

Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1963).
131 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1234, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1966).

This report

accompanied S. 1336 which was virtually the same as S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1967).
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term "rule," and the more restricted version just described, makes
comparisons between the present statute and these proposals somewhat
awkward and misleading. That fact should be kept in mind during
the following discussion.
The bill sponsored by the American Bar Association, designated
as S. 2335,' inserted a qualified exemption in place of the presently
unqualified one for rulemaking relating to subsection (a) (2) functions.
It stated that "notice of or public participation in rulemaking" would
not be required with respect to rulemaking "relating to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts to the extent that the agency finds
and publishes, with a statement of supporting reasons, that such public
participation would occasion delay or expense disproportionate to the
public interest." ' Where an agency could not make such a finding,
it could still utilize a generally applicable exemptive provision to adopt
temporary rules relating to those subjects without giving any prior
notice or chance for public participation. That provision applied
"where an agency finds that (1) immediate adoption of the rule is
imperatively necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety,
or welfare, or (2) compliance with the requirements of this section
would be contrary to the public interest." These findings, and a statement of the reasons for them, had to be published with the rule, which
could not be valid for more than six months unless it was extended
in compliance with the usual notice and opportunity to participate
requirements of section 553.1"4 And finally, in no case did the ABA
bill remove the right of interested persons to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule, and the agencies' obligations in respect
thereto.
S. 1663 13 substituted for the present section 553(a) (2) exemptions a slightly different kind of qualified provision than that used
by the ABA bill. In those cases where "notice and public participation
would be unwarranted or contrary to the public interest," rulemaking
relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" was
specifically excluded from every provision of section 553, including the
right to petition. 6 There was no requirement that the agency publish
such a finding or the reasons for it with the rule so issued. Rulemaking
relating to the subjects under consideration here could also be excluded
from the notice and opportunity to participate provisions of section 553
under a generally applicable emergency exclusionary provision if the
13288th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).

See S.1663 Hearings, suepra note 30, at 32.
133 S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003(f) (2) (1964).
1-4 Id. § 1003(d).
'35 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963). See S. 1663 Hearings, satpranote 30, at 21.
136 S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1963).

1970]
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public interest demanded it. The bill stated that in any case where an
agency finds, and publishes the finding and the reasons for it with the
rule issued, "that adoption of the rule without notice is necessary in
the public interest," it may do so. However, in such situations the
emergency rule could not be effective for more than six months, and
could be renewed only by commencement of a rulemaking proceeding
13 7
following usual procedures.
The Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure brought out a revised version of S. 1663 "" which completely
abandoned the specific qualified exemption for "public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts" found in the original version of the bill.
Revised S. 1663 contained no exception of any kind for rulemaking
relating to these subjects as such. The modified bill did, however,
continue in almost identical terms, and under almost the exact same
limits as the original, the general emergency exemption from the notice
and public participation provisions for all rulemaking that needed such
treatment because it was "necessary in the public interest." The revision also added an additional general exemption to the notice provision for "minor revisions and refinements of rules." 139
The rulemaking section of S. 518 of the Ninetieth Congress
was almost identical to the rulemaking section of S. 1336 of the Eightyninth Congress, which passed the Senate in 1966.1 In neither bill did
the rulemaking section mention "public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts" as such. This meant that rulemaking involving those
subjects was governed by the procedures usually required, unless in
some particular case it came within one of the express general exclusions added to section 553 in place of the section 553 (a) (2) exclusions
which had been deleted. The newly added exclusions in S. 518 exempted from every provision of the rulemaking section, including the
right to petition subsection, "minor exceptions from, revisions of, or
refinements of, rules which do not affect protected substantive rights,"
and "rulemaking that relates solely to the establishment or revision
of monetary rates or policy." 142 Additionally, S. 518 continued in
'3.3d. § 4(b).
138 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1.
139 Revised S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b) (1964). A permanent exemption,
not relevant to this discussion, was also provided for rules relating to foreign affairs
and national defense or to internal management or personnel of an agency. Id. § 4.
140 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See S.518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 2.
141 S. 1336, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1.
The only relevant difference in the rulemaking sections of the two bills is that S. 518
added an exemption for "rulemaking that relates solely to the establishment or revision
of monetary rates or policy" [§4(h) (6)] to the other exemptions from § 4 already contained in S. 1336.
142 S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(h) (1967).
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very similar form the generally applicable emergency rules exemption
found in both S. 1663 and revised S. 1663.L43
As a result of hearings held on S. 518 two modifications of that
bill were proposed. The first of these was S. 2770,' which was similar
to S. 518 in every respect relevant to the discussion here, except that it
added an additional exemption to help compensate for the elimination
of the subsection (a) (2) exclusions under consideration. The added
exemption relieved "rulemaking that relates solely to . . . wage determinations" ' from every provision of the rulemaking section, including
the right to petition subsection.
The second modification of S. 518 introduced a number of sharp
changes from the original. S. 2771 '" contained all of the exemptions
found in S. 518 discussed previously except that relating to minor
exceptions or revisions. In addition, it completely and unqualifiedly
excluded from every part of the rulemaking section "rulemaking that
relates to public contracts." "4 In so doing, it treated "contracts"
differently than "public property, loans, grants [and] benefits," which
were nowhere referred to in the Act as such. This bill also contained
two generally applicable exemptions not present in S. 518. It completely excluded from every requirement of section 553, including the
right to petition, "rulemaking that relates solely to the establishment
or revision of monetary rates, monetary policy, or other matters, with
respect to which notice of proposed rulemaking would seriously impair
the effectiveness of the rule." 148 It also exempted from every requirement of section 553 "situations in which the agency finds (and incorporates in the finding a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedures thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 149
Prior discussion presents only the general outlines of the most
important previous efforts to alter section 553 (a) (2). It demonstrates
that much consideration has been given to the elimination or modification of these exemptions and that there is substantial agreement that
some change with respect to the subsection (a) (2) exclusions is necessary. Most of the above proposals, however, do not present as desirable
a solution for the problem at hand as that to be discussed in the next
section. They are not narrowly enough tailored to secure the best
143

Id. §4 (d).

Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
S. 2770, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h) (6) (B) (1967).
14690th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
147 S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h) (5) (1967).
148 Id. § 553(h) (6). The language commencing with "or other matters" is not
present in S. 518.
149 Id. § 553(h) (4).
144 90th
145
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accommodation of the competing interests involved. Almost all of the
prior bills seek to deal with problems arising from the repeal of subsection (a) (2) through the use of new exemptive language, most of
which is not demonstrably superior to existing language of section 553
that could be used as efficiently for the same purpose. Consider the
following illustrations.
As noted earlier, the continued exclusion of all rulemaking relating to contracts, which is a feature of S. 2771, seems unwarranted.
Similarly, the express exclusions for "all rulemaking that relates solely
to the establishment or revision of monetary rates or policy" as found
in S. 518 and S. 2771 may also be overbroad as a rational accommodation of the interests involved. Some rulemaking within this
definition might not need to be excluded from the ordinary rulemaking
procedures of section 553. For instance, setting the discount rate for
banks needs to be done without prior public notice. But a proposed
rule limiting the rate of interest that may be paid by member banks
of the Federal Reserve System on time or savings deposits to no more
than "the applicable maximum rate authorized by law to be paid upon
such deposits by State banks or trust companies organized under the
laws of the State in which such member bank is located," 1" may not
need to be exempted from usual rulemaking requirements-even though
such a rule may "relate solely to the establishment or revision of
monetary rates or policy." The exemption for rulemaking that "relates
solely to . . . wage determinations" found in S. 2770 may also be

overbroad. It not only exempts such rulemaking in an unusual situation like that faced by the Department of Labor, but in all situations,
regardless of the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, it
not only exempts the wage determinations themselves, but also all rulemaking that "relates solely to" those determinations.
New exemptive language whose function can as easily and efficiently be performed by existing section 553 exclusionary terminology
is also plentiful in the above bills. It was inserted to cure the problems
resulting from their elimination of present subsection (a) (2). For
example, S.2335 exempts rulemaking where "such public participation
would occasion delay or expense disproportionate to the public interest"; S. 1663 exempts rulemaking from usual procedures when they
are "unwarranted or contrary to the public interest"; revised S. 1663
exempts all "minor revisions and refinements of rules"; S.518 enlarges
that to an exemption for all "minor revisions and refinements of rules
which do not affect substantive rights"; and S. 2771 exempts from
usual requirements "matters with respect to which notice of proposed
15012 C.F.R. § 217.3 (c)(2) (1969). See also, e.g., id. § 2172 (prohibiting
the payment of interest on demand deposits and defining interest for these purposes).
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rulemaking would seriously impair effectiveness of a rule." Subsequent
discussion should demonstrate that the problems sought to be solved
by inserting the above new language as a substitute for the subsection
(a) (2) exclusions can easily, and perhaps more satisfactorily, be cured
by other exemptive terminology already contained in section 553.
VIT. A SOLUTION: SECTION 553(b) (B) AND SECTION 553(d) (3)
According to section 553(b) (B) the provisions of section
553(b)-(c) are inapplicable "when the agency for good cause finds
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor
in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." This
qualified and limited exemption from two subsections of section 553
deserves careful examination because it may be a satisfactory substitute
for the overbroad, unqualified exemptions presently contained in subsection (a) (2).
The exemption found in section 553 (b) (B) is narrowly tailored
because it requires an administrative assessment of the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding each case of rulemaking to which it is
sought to be applied. The reports of the Senate and House committees
responsible for the APA clearly stated that
[t]he exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is not
an "escape clause" in the sense that any agency has discretion
to disregard its terms or the facts. A true and supported or
supportable finding of necessity or emergency must be made
and published.1 1
By this, committees intended to establish a restrictive meaning of
the terms "when the agency for good cause finds" which precede the
enumeration of grounds upon which this particular exemption is
available.
Therefore, the agencies are required under this provision to make
specific findings, meeting what has been interpreted to be a strict
standard, before they can avail themselves of the exemption. Some
commentators have argued that the courts should not examine the
accuracy of the required administrative finding when the validity of an
agency's use of this exemption arises in litigation. 5 However, this
finding is judicially reviewable on the same basis as any other finding
151 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 200, 258. See also id. 358 (remarks of Rep.
Walter).
152 See R. PARKE, ADmINIsTRATIVE LAw 182-83 (1952) ; Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. REv. 368, 384-85 (1946).
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committed to an agency's judgment. 15 3 Thus, if the finding is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law" or is "unsupported by substantial evidence" based on the
whole record, it will be set aside and the rule promulgated rendered
invalid.154 Of course, in such cases the presumption of validity will
rest, as it always does, with the administrative action, the burden of
overturning it resting upon the assailant.
There is one interpretation of section 553(b) (B) which should be
rejected at the outset. It can be argued that an agency seeking to come
within the section 553(b) (B) exemption must find that it is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" for the
agency to follow the procedures of subsection (b) in each separate
rulemaking case to which it seeks to apply the exemption, and that it
cannot make that finding wholesale as to any narrowly tailored class
or group of rulemaking situations. This interpretation relies upon
certain somewhat ambiguous language in the provision: "when the
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)." It also relies upon
the supposed intention of Congress to provide a means by which individual cases could be separately considered on their own merits, and
an exemption granted only in those specific cases in which it was
justified on one of the grounds stated.
While the above argument has great merit and is a sound general
rule by which to construe section 553 (b) (B), it overlooks two points.
First, it may be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest" to follow usual section 553 procedures in every single instance
of a specific type of rulemaking under a particular statute, when each
such instance is viewed in isolation. In those circumstances it seems
a foolish waste to require repetitive and redundant findings and full
publication of those findings. As will be explained later, rulemaking
setting the discount rate for the Federal Reserve System is an example
of that kind of situation. 5 5
Second, there are also situations where compliance with the procedures of section 553(b)-(c) is not "impracticable" or "contrary to
the public interest" as applied to any single instance of rulemaking on
a given subject, but becomes so as to a whole class if those requirements
must be followed for all such similar instances of rulemaking. For
15 3 See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); Durkin v. Wagner
Co., 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) aff'd per curiam sub norn. Mitchell v. Wagner
Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954),cert. denied, 348 U. S. 964 (1955). See also National
Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967).
In this last case, it is not clear whether § 553(b) (B) or § 553(B) (A) was involved.
154 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2) (A), (2) (E) (Supp. IV, 1969). See also cases cited note

153 supra.
55
' See text accompanying note 185 infra.
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example, so many different rules of a particular type may have to be
issued within a short time period that affording notice and an opportunity to participate in every such case would be practically impossible,
would frustrate the proper performance of the agency's functions, or
would cause other substantial deleterious consequences. The wage
determinations made by the Department of Labor under the DavisBacon and related acts provide an example of such a situation. Procedures of the type specified in section 553 may not be "impracticable"
or "contrary to the public interest" with respect to any one such determination viewed in isolation; but those procedures undoubtedly become
so when they must be applied to all such determinations.
As a result, the exemption contained in section 553 (b) (B) should
be read to allow an agency to make the requisite finding for a
whole class of rulemaking. But this should only be permitted if the
agency can either make that finding as to every single member of the
class considered separately, or as to every single member of the class
because it would be "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest"
to impose section 553 procedures on all members. Of course, agencies
must be required to draw their classes for this purpose as narrowly
as possible in order to exclude no more under this exception than is
absolutely justifiable in terms of the statutory criteria. Overbreadth
of any kind in the drawing of such a class of rules should not be
tolerated. Consideration might also be given to shifting the burden
of proof to the agency with respect to such group as opposed to individual case delineations, thus forcing the agency to justify its definition
of a "class" of rulemaking sought to be excluded from usual procedures.
Such a limitation, however, may not be necessary and may have some
undesirable consequences.
The grounds specified in section 553(b) (B) upon which an
agency may dispense with the usual rulemaking procedures are stated
in the alternative, so that any one of the three grounds listed is sufficient to invoke the exemption." 6 The first ground upon which the
qualified exemption becomes available is when the notice and participation requirements of section 553 are found to be "impracticable."
Webster defines the term as meaning, among other things, "infeasible,"
"impractical, unwise, imprudent." 117 Earlier drafts of the APA would
have made the exemption available when the public rulemaking procedures were "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of time or other
emergency," '- but the qualifying language after "impracticable" was
156 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 11, at 30.
1 57

WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1136 (3rd ed. 1966).
158 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 140, 148, 157. See also id. 181. The version
at 181 reads, "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency
affecting public safety or health."
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subsequently dropped. The Senate and House reports on the APA
stated that "impracticable" means a situation "in which the due and
required execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings." '5'
The term "unnecessary," which is the second exemptive ground
specified in section 553(b) (B), connotes something which is "not
necessary: useless, needless." 160 The legislative history indicates that
it must be unnecessary "so far as the public is concerned, as would be
the case if a minor or merely technical amendment in which the public
is not particularly interested were involved."

'6"

On this basis one

court seems to have concluded that "unnecessary" applies to situations
in which an agency rule is "minor or emergency in character," 102 or
"'a routine determination,' 'insignificant in nature and impact,' and
unimportant 'to the industry and to the public.' " 163
Rulemaking is also exempted by section 553 (b) (B) from advance
notice and public participation when adherence to those procedures
would be "contrary to the public interest." According to the APA's
legislative history, this phrase "supplements the terms 'impracticable'
or 'unnecessary'; it requires that public rulemaking procedures shall not
prevent an agency from operating and that, on the other hand, lack of
public interest in rulemaking warrants an agency to dispense with
public procedure." 164 The Attorney General's Manual takes the position that " 'public interest' connotes a situation in which the interest of
the public would be defeated by any requirement of advance notice." 165
At some point during their legislative history all three terms"impracticable," "unnecessary," and "contrary to the public interest"were referred to as operating "only where facts and interests are such
that notice and proceedings are impossible or manifestly unnecessary" 160
and as exempting "situations of emergency or necessity." 167 However,
the weight of their legislative history, as well as their language, clearly
establishes that these terms were not meant to be so narrowly limited.
At the same time it must be remembered that these are qualified grounds
for exemption and are not to be construed more broadly than the demands of sound government administration and wise public policy
159Id. 200, 258. Accord, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 11, at 30.
60
1 WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2504 (3rd ed. 1966).
101 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 200, 258. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

supra note 11, at 31.
162 Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969).
163 Id. at 743 (citing National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States,
268 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 1967).
164 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 200, 258.
165 ATToRNEY GENERAi'S MANUAL, spra note 11, at 31.
166 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 358.
lo67Id. 200, 258.
MANUAL,
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require. It is worth repeating that the section 553(b) (B) exemption
is "not an 'escape' clause in the sense that an agency has discretion to
disregard its terms or its facts." 168 An agency can use this exemption
only if it has "good cause" within the provisions of the Act.
A more detailed description of how the section 553 (b) (B) exemption might operate in practice will demonstrate that it could satisfactorily
handle the problems resulting from a repeal of section 553 (a) (2)-and
do so on the basis of a rational accommodation between the need for
public participation in rulemaking on the one hand, and the need for
efficient, effective, expeditious, and inexpensive government administration on the other. Although the terms "impracticable," "unnecessary," and "contrary to the public interest" overlap to some extent, an
effort will be made, insofar as possible, to examine their applications
separately. But it should be remembered that in light of the very close
relationship between these terms, the following analysis of their applications should also be considered as partially overlapping.
Consider the exemption for situations where public procedures are
found to be "unnecessary." This could undoubtedly perform the function intended by the exception for "minor revisions and refinements of
rules" found in several of the bills discussed earlier, and probably more
satisfactorily so because the existing term may be more narrowly
tailored. For example, the "unnecessary" exemption seems to cover
situations where a rule involved is in fact of such a minor nature, like
the rule requiring government loan instruments to be signed in ink, that
public procedures would be a predictable and indisputable waste. Also
under this "unnecessary" exemption, public procedures may be dispensed with for rules announcing the exact penalty rates applicable to
the marketing of certain commodities in excess of the farm-marketing
quota. The Department of Agriculture's action in those cases only
involves a mathematical computation, the statute specifying that the
rates are to be a certain percentage of parity or support price of the
commodity as of a particular date.'69 Similarly, usual rulemaking procedures are also "unnecessary" for mere technical changes in regulations.
If, for example, the statute citations contained in a regulation must be
altered to conform to changes in the numbering of the United States
Code, or regulations are rewritten or reorganized purely for style, with
no substantive changes, public procedures are obviously "unnecessary."
On the other hand, under this exemption agencies should not be
permitted to decide lightly that public procedures are "unnecessary."
168 Id. See text accompanying note 152.

169 1957 HousE STuDY, supra note 51, at 26-27.
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In Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission17 o the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals considered an FPC regulation which had been promulgated without resort to the public procedures of section 553 (b)-(c).
The regulation required natural gas companies to pay a compound interest rate, for the first time, on all amounts refunded to their customers
because of overcharges resulting from new rates subsequently found to
be unjustified. After considering all of the Commission's arguments,
the court held that the rule was invalid because of the failure to follow
section 553 (b) - (c) procedures in its promulgation.
The court in Texaco explained that "the rule does not fall within
the 'unnecessary' exception relied on by the Commission since it cannot
be classified as either minor or emergency in character." 171 The court
refused to accept the argument that the section 553 procedures were
"unnecessary" because they found that "the compound rate would affect
numerous jurisdictional gas companies and potentially involves large
sums of money." 172 The court also expressly rejected the Commission's contention that the procedures were "unnecessary" because the
new rule imposed no obligation on affected parties that could not have
been imposed on them by ad hoc adjudicatory orders in each case. "The
crucial fact is that the Commission elected to proceed in the case by
making a general rule and, when engaged in rulemaking, it must comply with the procedural requirements imposed on rulemaking by the
Administrative Procedure Act, which it failed to do. . . ,,173
By holding as it did, the court in the Texaco case seems to have
taken the position that the ability of an agency to achieve the same
result as a rule by another means, such as through ad hoc adjudication,
does not make the requirements of section 553(b)-(c) "unnecessary"
when the agency in fact elects to achieve that result through rulemaking.
This is not the place to fully explore the wisdom of that result. 7 4 However, a number of general points are worth making here. The result in
Texaco can be justified in light of the fact that the APA favors public
participation in rulemaking in all cases except those where very good
reasons preclude it; the fact that the rule was not minor in its effects,
and had a large financial impact on many companies; 175 and the fact
170 412

F2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
-171Id.at 743.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 745.

174
Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (holding an agency
order issued to a party in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding valid and enforceable, even though the same requirement announced in the course of an adjudication as a
prospective rule only would be void because it failed to follow the rulemaking requirements of § 553). See generally Comment, Wyman-Gordon and the F-xcelsior Rule,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 621 (1969).
175 412 F.2d at 743 n.7.
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that the agency did make a conscious choice to proceed by rulemaking
which would result in an order of general applicability rather than by
an ad hoc order in each case." 6 On the other hand, one of the undesirable effects of this decision may be to discourage the use of general
rules in favor of ad hoc adjudication, a result which is usually contrary
17
to the sound administration of regulatory policies.
The "unnecessary" exemption should not allow agencies to avoid
section 553 procedures merely on the ground that a rule is "minor" or
"unimportant" because it only has a small impact on a very limited
segment of the public. It is wise to have well-informed decision-making
and citizen-participation in government rulemaking which has a relatively small impact on limited segments of the public, as well as in
those actions which have a great impact on large portions of the public.
Consider the following case, for example.
One congressional office got a host of complaints from
people, not only in that area, but throughout the country, on
an unimportant rule which an agency had made without any
public notice or hearing, related to public property. It related
to how many pounds of petrified wood you could take off the
premises of a national reservation of some type. And this
agency had thought-well, it is a terrible thing to lose all
these hunks of stone, so they-within their own internal
organization, they came up with one pound, or something like
that.
This provoked all this correspondence to Congress.
So the congressional people involved went down to the
agency . . . [which] said-"Oh, well, we realize we made a

mistake, we will raise it to five pounds." So the congressmen
went back and said we solved the problem. The agency said
yes, very unimportant.
Well, that provoked ten times more mail than came in
the first time, because it turned out that five pounds just
didn't qualify under the standards by which petrified wood is
traded in the market of . . . collectors

....

It has to be

a bigger poundage.
Well, the moral of that particular story was that this
supposedly minor rule . . . turned out to be important to a

lot of people in this country, and the fact that the agency did
not give public notice, and give the public a chance to express
17s Id. at 744 n.9.
'77 See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956);
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Auerbach,
Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 Wls. L. REV.
95; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HAtgv. L. Ruv. 921 (1965).
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its opinion,
caused a heck of a lot of trouble for an awful lot
17 8
of people.

The "impracticable" exemption could adequately deal with a number of different situations in which a requirement of advance notice
of rulemaking and public participation therein would be unreasonable.
In cases of emergency where a rule is needed immediately in order to
avoid injury or frustration of a program's objectives, the usual section
553(b)-(c) procedures can be disregarded because they are "impracticable." According to the Attorney General's Manual, for example,
"the Civil Aeronautics Board may learn, from an accident investigation,
that certain rules concerning air safety should be issued or amended
without delay; with the safety of the traveling public at stake, the
Board could find that notice and public rule-making procedures would
be 'impracticable,' and issue its rules immediately." 179 Similarly, where
haste is needed, safety rules applicable to trucks and railroads, and rules
regarding the marking, packing, and handling of dangerous items like
explosives on such carriers, must also be permitted to avoid the usual
procedures set out in section 553(b)-(c) on the grounds that such
procedures are "impracticable." 180
The Department of Agriculture has properly stated that the same
rationale is equally applicable when the Department must impose or
modify animal or plant quarantines promptly to prevent the spread of
diseases or insect pests; or when the Department makes orders under
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 to continue temporary rate
schedules previously authorized after notice and an opportunity to be
heard, if prompt action is necessary to avoid a reversion to rates and
charges that are unrealistic in light of existing economic conditions; or
when the Department finds that last minute changes are necessary in
acreage allotments and marketing quota regulations under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, because farmers must know of such
changes prior to planting. 81 To force adherence to the procedures of
section 553 in any of these situations would be "impracticable" because
time is of the essence.
Consider also the situation presented in the case of Durkin v.
Edward S. Wagner Co.'
In a prior decision involving the same
parties, the court had held that particular workers were not covered
by certain regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This
178

ABA Symposium on S.1336, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1966, Transcript 110-11.

179 ATTORNEY GENERAr's MANUAL, supra note 11, at 30-31.
1s0 1957 HousE STUDY, supra note 51, at 1760 (Interstate Commerce

Commission).

181 Id. 26-27. See also Dighton v. Coffman, 178 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Ill. 1959),
aff'd, 279 F2d 497 (7th Cir. 1960).
182 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd Per curiam sub norn. Mitchell v.
Wagner Co., 217 F2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
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holding was contrary to the interpretation and practice of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, an interpretation known
and relied upon by the industry involved. As an immediate response
to this decision, and without resort to usual rulemaking procedures, the
Administrator promulgated a rule which included those workers within
the relevant regulations.
When he issued the new rule, the Administrator stated that it
would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest"
to follow usual rulemaking procedures in the making of this "clarifying" regulation. "[I]mmediately effective clarification of the regulations is essential in order to accomplish the intent of the present regulations to safeguard the wage standards in the industry, to eliminate the
unfair competitive situation, and to provide for adequate enforcement of
the home work restrictions." 183 On the basis of this evidence, and the
absence of any evidence to controvert it, the court held that the rule
involved was properly treated as within the section 553(b) (B)
exception.184
The court's result seems justifiable because any delay in promulgation of the rule would have encouraged employers to abandon their
previous adherence to the Administrator's interpretation of the earlier
rule until a new rule to the same effect was formally adopted. This
would have hurt countless employees who had come to rely on the
fruits of the prior interpretation. It also would have injured those
employers who chose, despite their competitors' contrary action, to
keep their wages at the levels demanded by the earlier interpretation
of the Administrator during the period in which the new rule was
being adopted with public procedures.
Either the "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest"
exemption, or both, must be deemed to cover rulemaking relating to
the debt management functions of the Treasury when notice and public
participation would result in frustration of the Department's operations
in that regard, or in other undesirable consequences. Either of those
exemptions could also cover rulemaking such as that determining "discount rates established by Federal Reserve Banks, and changes in gen1

83 Id. at 122.
18 4 Id. at 122-23. On appeal the court said:
Judge Galston has found that the defendant's operations fall within the
amended regulations and that the regulations were properly promulgated
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a). D.C.E.D.N.Y.,
115 F. Supp. 118. We see no reason to overturn his well-reasoned conclusions.
While there was no advance notice of the amendment, yet that was not necessary, both because of its nature as an "interpretive" rule and because of the
Administrator's finding of "good cause" for immediate action, based upon the
fact that other employers in general were complying with this interpretation of
the Act and defendant had long known of the view held by the Administrator.
217 F2d at 304.
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eral requirements regarding reserves of member banks, maximum
interest rates on time and savings deposits, or credit for purchasing or
carrying securities." The delay involved in according prior notice and
public participation in those cases would ordinarily "prevent the action
from becoming effective as promptly as necessary" to meet current
economic exigencies, thereby making such procedures "impracticable"
under those circumstances. The delay involved in adherence to usual
procedures might also "permit speculators or others to reap unfair
profits or to interfere with the Board's action taken .

.

.

."

"

The

next exemption to be discussed focuses on these latter problems.
An agency can ignore usual rulemaking procedures under section
553(b) (B) whenever advance notice would tend to defeat a rule's
purpose because in such situations those procedures would certainly be
"contrary to the public interest." "' The function sought to be performed by the exemption found in one of the bills discussed earlier for
"matters with respect to which notice of proposed rulemaking would
seriously impair effectiveness of a rule," is adequately performed by
the existing "contrary to the public interest" terminology. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission "has often deemed it
inadvisable to submit a proposed regulatory rule to the industry because
of the danger that certain companies might take advantage of the
interim period to effect transactions which the rule is designed to
prevent or control and thus escape the intended regulation of conduct
altogether." 187

The Department of Commerce has reported that "[i] n the exercise
of [its] priority and allocation functions [under the Defense Production Act of 1950], speed in the issuance of orders and regulations is
often essential as prior notice of proposed governmental action would
tend to defeat the purpose intended to be accomplished thereby. For
example, notice of intention to place certain materials under production
control or to limit acquisition thereof might create panic buying in an
effort to get the jump on the regulation and on competitors." 118 In
such cases the Bureau of Defense Services Administration properly invoked the section 553 (b) (B) exemption on the grounds that adherence
to usual procedures in that situation would be "contrary to the public
interest." 1 9 Similarly, the Department of Interior rule placing a
185

12 C.F.R. § 2622(e) (1969). See also S. 518 Hearings,supra note 30, at 366-67.

186 See 1941 Hearings, supra note 17, at 812. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL, supra note 11, at 31.
187 B. ScHWARTZ, AN INTRODUcTION To AmEIcAN ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 62
(1958).
188 1957 HousE STUDY, supra note 51, at 115.
189 Id.
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moratorium on applications respecting the public lands, would also fit
within the exception.
There is also no reason why the "contrary to the public interest"
language of section 553 (b) (B) cannot be used satisfactorily to work
an overt accommodation between the need for public rulemaking procedures on the one hand, and the need for inexpensive, expeditious,
effective, and efficient government administration on the other. The
function performed by language like "occasion delay or expense disproportionate to the public interest," which appeared in one of the bills
discussed previously, can easily be performed by balancing the relevant
considerations under a standard such as "contrary to the public interest."
The "contrary to the public interest" terminology should allow the
Department of Labor an exemption for the wage determinations it
makes under the Davis-Bacon and related acts. Because of the especially large number of such "rules" that the Department must continually make during a limited period, required adherence to usual rulemaking procedures in that situation would cause an unusually large
delay and/or increase in costs of all kinds. These extraordinary deleterious consequences resulting from the peculiar facts of the administration of this program outweigh any positive good that might result
from requiring adherence to normal rulemaking procedures. The
existence of seemingly successful alternative procedures to provide interested persons with adequate notice of, and a chance to contribute
views in relation to, those wage determinations eliminates any possibility that the Department should have to adhere to section 553 pro°
cedures in this situation.
190 S. 518 Hearings, supra note 30, at 92, 95 (statement of the AFL-CIO). In
addition, the Solicitor of Labor stated:
The actual wage determination procedure is initiated by the procurement
agency, which submits its request for a finding of wage rates prevailing in the
locality of the proposed project for the various classes of laborers and mechanics whose employment is required.
The request is usually made about thirty days before any advertisement
of specifications or the beginning of negotiations, as the case may be.
Where the information on hand as a result of the continuing program
referred to is sufficient to make findings, a decision is made.
If the information is not sufficient, a field survey is made. In the course
of the survey, local labor organizations, contractors, contractors' groups and
public agencies are contacted. Hearings may also be held in order to amplify
further the record upon which findings are to be based.
When the findings are made, and the wage determination is issued to the
requesting agency, copies of the wage determination are promptly sent to labor
organizations and contractor associations with the understanding that they will
be distributed to any local affiliates which may have an interest in the wage
determination. This is done in order to afford interested persons an opportunity to present timely requests for changes in the wage determination upon
the basis of any evidence that they may have.
Interested persons may appeal for review of wage determinations by the
Department's Wage Appeals Board, which is empowered to pass upon all
questions of law and fact.
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Similarly, the "contrary to the public interest" standard found in
section 553 (b) (B) should permit exemptions for other extraordinary
situations. Where the delay and costs involved are in fact so very
large, due to the special facts of the case, that they outweigh the strong
public interests favoring adherence to usual rulemaking procedures, an
exception could be allowed. More than just "any increase in cost or
delay" will be necessary to justify such an exception under the "contrary
to the public interest" standard. The facts will have to demonstrate
that an atypically large delay or increase in cost will result from adherence to normal rulemaking procedures, and that the extraordinary
delay or cost is not outweighed by the benefits of adherence to those
usual procedures. Situations of this sort will be relatively few. Those
increased costs and delays which are ordinarily to be expected are
properly treated by the Act as an acceptable quid pro quo for the important benefits achieved by requiring advance notice and public participation under section 553.
Section 553(d) (3) should perform the same function for section
553(d) as section 553(b) (B) performs for section 553(b)-(c). According to section 553 (d) (3), an agency can dispense with the section
553 (d) required publication or service of a substantive rule at least
thirty days before its effective date, whenever the agency decides to do
so "for good cause found and published with the rule." This "good
cause" exemption should give agencies at least as much discretion to
avoid the application of section 553 (d) in appropriate cases as the
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" exemption gives them to avoid the application of section 553(b)-(c). Indeed,
the former may give agencies even more discretion than the latter because the guiding terms "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest" are conspicuously absent from section 553(d) (3).
Nevertheless, in order to make the requirements of section 553 (d)
meaningful, the exemption from its terms should be construed to be as
broad, but no broader, than section 553(b) (B). If that is so, the
"good cause" required by section 553(d) (3) must, like the "good
cause" required by section 553(b) (B), be predicated on a finding that
adherence to usual procedures is "impracticable, unnecessary, or conSubstantive changes may be made in wage determinations without exception up to the ten-day period before the opening of bids for the construction
work. Thereafter, and until the award of the contract, a substantive change
may be made only where the procurement agency finds that there is a reasonable time in which to notify the bidders of the change.
Id. 240.

In those cases in which the Department serves personal notice of the wage deter-

minations on the parties "subject thereto," or those parties have notice thereof as

provided by law, the Department can dispense with the usual advance notice and public

participation requirements because of § 553(b), and need not even rely on a modified
§ 553(b) (B). See also text accompanying note 203 infra.
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trary to the public interest." The legislative history of the "good
cause" exception in section 553(d) (3) supports the conclusion that
the two exemptions should be treated as congruent. The House Report
on the APA states that:
[This] exception-upon good cause found and published-is
not an "escape clause" which may be exercised at will but
requires legitimate grounds supported in law and fact by the
required finding. Many rules . . .may be made operative
in less than 30 days because of inescapable or unavoidable
limitations of time, because of the demonstrable urgency of
the conditions they are designed to correct, and because the
parties subject to them may during the usually protracted
hearing and decision procedures anticipate the regulation. 9 '
Previous discussion should demonstrate that if the section 553 (a)
(2) exemptions under consideration were eliminated, the exclusions
found in section 553(b) (B) and section 553(d) (3) could adequately
handle any peculiar problems created thereby. Where a rational balancing of the relevant interests would indicate the desirability of an
exception from the requirements imposed by section 553(b)-(d) for
particular rulemaking, the above "good cause" exemptions could suffice
to achieve the result
No special exemption is needed from the right to petition provision
of section 553(e) if the subsection (a) (2) exclusions are repealed.
Interested parties should always have the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. As noted earlier, the only obligation which that right imposes on an agency is the duty to follow its
own rules with respect to such petitions, and the duty to respond under
section 555 (e) by giving "[p] rompt notice . . .of the denial in whole
or in part of a . . .petition . . . accompanied by a brief statement of
the grounds for denial." If the need arises, an agency may respond to
a group of similar petitions as an entity. Consequently, no situation
involving one or more petitions for a rule relating to the subsection
(a) (2) subjects would seem to require even a qualified exemption from
section 553(e). Currently no exemption from the right to petition
requirement is deemed necessary for any rulemaking already subject to
the terms of section 553. In light of the importance of that right, and
the minor burden it imposes on agencies, this position seems fully
justifiable.
If the right to petition continues unhampered by any exceptions
even after the subsection (a) (2) exemptions are removed, an important
salutary consequence will follow. In every case where usual public
191 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 2, at 260. See also id. 201; Buckeye Cablevision,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 387 F.2d 220, 228 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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procedures are dispensed with prior to the promulgation of a rule because the qualified exemptions of section 553(b) (B) are applicable,
interested parties will have an effective chance to express their views on
that rule subsequent to its enactment. They can file a petition for the
amendment, repeal, or modification of the rule in question, including a
statement of their reasons therefor. The agency will then be obliged to
respond, as section 555 (e) requires, with "[p] rompt notice . . . of the
denial in whole or in part of . . . [the] petition . . . accompanied by
a brief statement of the grounds for denial," unless it affirms a prior
denial or the denial is self-explanatory. It should be recalled that the
previously discussed bills to reform section 553 required initiation of
public procedures within a stipulated period after an emergency rule
was promulgated in order to continue its effectiveness. Such an approach has merit in assuring public participation subsequent to a rule's
issuance in those cases in which it was impossible beforehand. The
right to petition should provide some of the same protection.
The section 553 (b) (B) and section 553 (d) (3) exemptions impose
a special obligation of disclosure on agencies utilizing those provisions.
An agency must incorporate in the rules issued without following usual
procedures the necessary statement of "good cause" predicated upon a
finding that adherence to section 553 (b)-(d) is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest"; it must also include a brief
statement of the reasons for that finding. In cases where the exemption
is utilized based on a finding with respect to a whole class of cases, only
one such full publication relating to the whole class should be required.
Rules in that class subsequently issued without resort to usual procedures would only need to refer to the prior full publication of findings
and reasons, and give its citation. To be of value, the reasons listed in
the rules as justification for the failure to follow usual procedures must,
of course, be fairly specific. Declarations in the language of the Act
will not satisfy this requirement and should be deemed inadequate under
the statute. At the same time the required statement of reasons need
not be so detailed as to be unduly onerous.
The above disclosure obligation will have two salutary effects.
First, such a requirement will force the agency to consider very carefully its reasons for each such action. Second, by requiring an official
statement of the agency's reasons for using the exemption, judicial
review of that action will be facilitated. If such action is challenged in
a judicial proceeding, the court can test its validity against the reasons
provided in the prior publication. Having stated the reasons for their
conduct in this regard both formally and publicly, agencies will presumably not be allowed to assert others as justifications if the ones
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originally given prove to be inadequate. This should keep agencies
both thoughtful and honest in the use of this exemption.
The survey prepared specially for this study asked all federal
agencies the following question:
Why are the several specific exemptions currently contained
in § 553(b)-(e) insufficient to deal with any disadvantages
that might be encountered by your department or agency if
all of § 553(a) (1)-(2) was repealed? Among these specific
exemptions just referred to is that contained in § 553(b) (B)
providing that public notice of rulemaking and participation
by interested persons in rulemaking is not required "when
the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."
Agencies making rules presently exempted by subsection (a) (2) from
section 553 responded in various ways to this question. These responses, and the following discussion of section 553 (b) (B), may also
be considered applicable to the section 553(d) (3) exemption since, as
noted earlier, the requirements of that exemption are probably congruent with those of section 553(b) (B).
Some respondents to the above question insisted that the section
553 (b) (B) exemption was an insufficient substitute for subsection
(a) (2) because the latter is necessary as it is, and the former is not
as broad as the latter. 19 2 Responses of this sort are of little help in
evaluating the impact that the proposed changes may have, and they
in no way detract from the solution previously suggested. They
amount to no more than an insistence that section 553(a) (2) is necessary, and that nothing less is acceptable, without any explanation why
other existing exemptions, including section 553 (b) (B), are inadequate
substitutes for the subject matter exemptions of subsection (a) (2).
A frequent objection to section 553(b) (B) as a substitute for
section 553 (a) (2) is that making the findings required by the former
would constitute too great an administrative burden on the agencies. 3
192 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (responses of Atomic Energy Commission; Post
Office; Forest Service and Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture).
For example, the Post Office stated:
It is considered that the specific exemptions contained in Sec. 553(b)-(e)
are not well adapted to serve as substitutes for the subject area exemptions.
It is believed that the exemption stated in Sec. 553(a) [2] reflects a proper and
generalized finding that the provisions of Sec. 553(b)-(e) are not appropriate
for rulemaking in these subject matter areas and that the reasons underlying
this will continue despite repeal of Sec. 553 (a) [2].
193 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (responses of Department of Defense; FHA
Commodity Stabilization Division, Department of Agriculture; Veterans' Administration; Small Business Administration; Office of Economic Opportunity).

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING

For example, the Department of Defense stated that "admittedly, the
exemption is a broad one in which DoD would rely in issuance of any
highly significant rule. .

.

.

But the scope and volume of substantive

rulemaking in the Department makes impracticable compliance with
the unwieldy requirement for a 'finding and a brief statement of reasons'
for the 'good cause.' "194 In light of the fact that the statement of
findings and reasons is only required in those cases in which the agency
opts out of the usual procedures, and that it can be made for a whole
class of rulemaking in the few instances where that can be justified on
the basis of the special facts and circumstances discussed previously,
this objection seems unsound. The burden involved here consists only
in the agency setting down, in each situation where justified, the finding
that public procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest," and a brief statement of the reasons why that is so.
To some extent agencies should be doing that in any case-if they are
in fact living up to their more general responsibilities to accord as much
participation in rulemaking as possible, consistent with their other
obligations. The burden, therefore, seems to be both of a kind and
quantity that the agencies should be willing and able to bear in light of
the attendant benefits.
A number of responses to the above question gave another reason
why current exemptions contained in section 553(b)-(e) are inadequate substitutes for the subject exemptions of section 553 (a) (2). It
is said that the scope of section 553(b) (B) is unclear and uncertain.
Reliance upon that exemption, therefore, would not clearly handle all
the problems created by a repeal of section 553 (a) (2) ; and it would
probably result in much litigation as to the scope of the subsection
(b) (B) exemption, causing undue delay in the execution of agency
programs and the like.'9 5 "Uncertainty about the scope of the exemption" and the fact that "such a finding [as is required by section
553(b) (B)] is subject to challenge in the courts making uncertain
the validity of any rule issued under this exemption" was noted. 9 6
The Department of Agriculture's Rural Electrification Administration
responded that the attendant possibilities for delay could be too easily
utilized by one who wanted to obstruct one of the agency's programs. 19 7
1969 Survey, supranote 27.
1)5 1969 Survey, supranote 27 (responses of Small Business Administration; REA,
Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Defense).
196 1969 Survey, supra note 27 (response of Department of Defense).
394

197

Just as the uncertainty of the scope of the other exemptions of Sec. 553
(b)-(e) invites litigations which could be used . . . to obstruct the proper
functioning of the agency . . . so this good cause exemption could invite
obstructive litigation. For example, Sec. 553(b) (B) requires a brief state-

ment of the reasons for finding the notice and public procedure impracticable,
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It is true that the terms "good cause" and "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" are not as precise as those
which categorically exempt all rulemaking "relating to .

.

. public

property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." The former terms are
more difficult to apply. They involve some balancing because of the
required special assessment of the facts in each case. Therefore, their
application is not as obvious or indisputable as that of section
553(a) (2).
Nevertheless, as previously noted, the language of section
553(b) (B) can adequately deal with all of the problems created by a
repeal of section 553(a) (2). It need not be as unclear as the opponents in this area claim. If section 553(a) (2) is repealed, a legislative history could also be created to clarify further the scope of section
553 (b) (B). Moreover, litigation of the scope and proper applicability
of "good cause" and "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest" is not apt to be any more endless or obstructive here
than it is elsewhere. And in light of the above discussion, it is not in
fact likely, in the overwhelming number of cases, to have any significant impact on the agencies' ability to perform their functions properly.
Stare decisis should have a substantial effect within a brief time. It
should also be noted that although wise and honest use of the section
553(b) (B) exemption by the relevant agencies will not forestall all
litigation, it will forestall some.
In the end, however, it must still be admitted that there remains a
real difference in clarity between the applicability of section 553 (a) (2)
and section 553(b) (B), and that some delays may be caused by litigation involving the latter. But these consequences are a price worth
paying for the largely increased scope of the guarantee of public participation in rulemaking involved. After all, no showing has been
made that they will have any serious ill effects in the mass of cases.
If the fear really is that agencies will have to be careful in utilizing this
qualified exemption, and that their hands will be tied by it to some
extent, they are right. Similarly, if the fear is that in particularly
close cases, the form of this exemption will cause agencies to utilize
normal rulemaking procedures rather than risk possible litigation resulting in invalidation of the rule," 8 that too is correct. Both of these
unnecessary or contrary to the public interest. The sufficiency of the agency's
reasons might be attacked in a suit. Whether or not REA's action is ultimately sustained, the litigation in the meantime could defeat the purpose of
the REA loan.
1969 Survey, upra note 27.
198 The Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration feared that
reliance solely upon the § 553(b) (B) exemption might discourage issuance of rules
and needed changes in rules. See 1969 Survey, supra note 27. This consequence
seems highly improbable. More likely is the consequence noted in the text above.
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results, however, are acceptable in light of the importance of the policy
favoring public participation in rulemaking.
A number of very important agencies from the point of view of the
section 553 (a) (2) exclusions admitted that the consequences resulting
from a repeal of those exemptions could be handled by the remaining
exemptions contained in section 553(b)-(e). The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare noted that "the several specific exemptions contained in section 553(b)-(e) are sufficient to deal with the
bulk of disadvantages that might be encountered if section 553 (a) (1)(2) were repealed." 19 In light of those other specific exemptions,
especially section 553 (b) (B), the Department of Transportation said
that it "could live" with the repeal of the subsection (a) (2) exemptions
under discussion and "would not object to [their] . . . repeal." 2

Similarly, the Department of Labor stated that the repeal of the exemptions relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts"
would cause that agency "no undue hardship in view of the specific
exemptions contained in section 553(b) (B)." 21

It did express an

exception, however, based on the assumption that its wage determinations problem might not be solved adequately by the latter exemption as
it is now deemed to operate. Since the revised section 553(b) (B) proposed here would enable the Department to solve this problem for that
whole class of rulemaking by one operation, their doubts should be
assuaged.
The same should be true of the Treasury Department. It admitted
that
if all of Section (a) (1)-(2) was repealed, in the preparation
of regulations which could not be published until announced
by the Secretary, and in which speed and its requisite corollary, secrecy, are necessities, and advanced publicity and
public participation opportunities, impossibilities, we recognize that we could resort to publication in our rule of a finding
that notice and public procedures are contrary to the public
interest.
But the Department was still concerned because it thought "an amendment of the nature indicated by this question does not take into account
199 1969 Survey, supra note 27. See also the following responses to the 1969
Survey. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration stated: "On balance . . . NASA should not find itself greatly disadvantaged by a removal of
[§ 553(a)] . . ." NASA went on to note that the exemptions presently contained
in 88 553(b) - (e), especially § 553(b) (B) "should be adequate to prevent unreasonable,
costly and empty exercises in rulemaking procedures from resulting." The Office of
Economic Opportunity admitted that "the good cause exemption would of course serve
as some protection against the undue formalism of the A.P.A. rulemaking procedures";
but it opposed repeal of § 553(a) (2).
200 1969 Survey, supra note 27. The Department said, however, it would object
to repeal of the "agency management and personnel" exemption of subsection (a) (2).
201 1969 Survey, supra note 27.
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the continuing functions of the Treasury in its debt management operations." 202 As noted earlier, to the extent that usual procedures are in
fact "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" with
respect to rulemaking involved in those functions, the Department has
no cause for concern. However, to the extent that concern is a product
of a desire for a broader exemption, the equities involved suggest it
should not be honored.
None of the objections stated to an "impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest" type solution to the problem under
consideration has sufficient merit to discourage utilization of that approach. Consequently, a repeal of the section 553 (a) (2) exemptions
"relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" accompanied by a construction of section 553(b) (B) and section 553
(d) (3) along the lines suggested would be an excellent means by which
to reconcile the conflicting societal interests involved. The exemptive
language should not and need not be so broadly construed as to render
it a meaningless limit on agency discretion forestalling adequate public
participation in rulemaking, nor so narrowly construed as to render it
an ineffective tool to deal with the real problems which admittedly might
be faced by certain agencies if section 553 (a) (2) was repealed.
As noted earlier, this kind of qualified exemption will remove from
the requirements of the rulemaking section virtually all of those situations now used to justify the across-the-board unqualified exceptions
presently contained in section 553 (a) (2). Unlike the latter provision,
however, the former has the advantage of excluding from the strictures
of section 553 (b)- (d) only those specific rulemaking situations where
competing interests of a high order clearly outweigh the interests in
public participation.
Furthermore, repeal of the section 553 (a) (2) exemptions in question will also be advantageous because the competing values involved
will be more adequately accommodated in another way. Unlike the
current unqualified exemption of subsection (a) (2) rulemaking from
every provision of section 553, the solution proposed would only exempt
particular instances of such rulemaking, where essential, from the specific subsections whose application would be unreasonable in those
instances. So, even if prior public participation under section 553 (b) (c) should be eliminated in a particular case of rulemaking, the agency
will still be required, as section 553 (e) unqualifiedly demands, to give
persons a right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule. As noted previously, exemption from that requirement seems
never to be justified.
2 Id.
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One final point with respect to the scope of the statutory reform
proposed here deserves note. Rulemaking is defined by the APA as the
process for formulating "agency statements of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy . . . ." " The procedures of section 553 are
better adapted to dealing with rulemaking of general applicability than
to dealing with rulemaking of particular applicability. Therefore, requiring adherence to the procedures of section 553 in the case of the
latter class of subsection (a) (2) rulemaking may create larger burdens
and smaller benefits than requiring adherence to those procedures for
similar rulemaking of general applicability.
However, by using one of two exemptions, an agency can avoid
the trouble of opening too wide the role of public participation in rulemaking of particular applicability. To the extent that it is more "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" to follow
normal procedures for subsection (a) (2) rulemaking of particular applicability than for such rulemaking of general applicability, the section
553 (b) (B) and section 553 (d) (3) exemptions can adequately handle
the problem. As a result, one may expect greater resort to the section
553(b) (B) and section 553(d) (3) exemptions for subsection (a) (2)
rulemaking of particular applicability than for such rulemaking of general applicability.
Furthermore, section 553 (b) permits agencies to avoid prior publication of notice in the FederalRegister if "persons subject thereto are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law." This means that after the repeal of
section 553 (a) (2), agencies will still not be required to publish advance notice of such rulemaking of particular applicability in the Federal
Register if they only do what is fair in any case: give the persons
"subject thereto" personal notice and "an opportunity to participate in
the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments." This seems to be the result of a reconciliation of the language
"persons subject thereto" in section 553(b) and "interested persons"
in section 553(c).
To continue the section 553 (a) (2) exclusion as applied to rulemaking of particular applicability would mean that rules of this sort
would be subject neither to the statutory provisions governing rulemaking procedure nor to the statutory provisions governing adjudicatory procedure. This result would be most unfortunate. Some clear
statutory protection ought to be given affected parties in situations
where agencies make rules of particular applicability relating to "public
2035

U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
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property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." The particular persons
involved have much at stake, and the public interest in assuring that
the official decision-makers are adequately informed in such cases is
great, even though not as great as in cases of rulemaking of general
applicability. Consequently, until that time when the general definition
of "rule" used in the APA is changed so that "rulemaking" of particular applicability is treated as adjudication, the procedural protections of
section 553 should be made applicable to all subsection (a) (2) regulation formation. The various exemptions now contained in section 553
will adequately deal with any special problems that arise from application of that provision to such rulemaking of particular applicability.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Serious proposals for the elimination of the section 553(a) (2)
exemptions for rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts" have been made since at least 1955. The Task
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure of the Hoover Commission noted in that year that
many rules governing proprietary matters, such as procedures
respecting public property, loans [grants], benefits, and contracts, are of vital importance to the members of the public
affected by them. Such rules often have a direct bearing
upon private interests, and participation in the rulemaking
process by those affected is appropriate and to be desired." °'
The Task Force concluded that "proprietary functions may . . be
effectively executed by agencies with public participation in the rulemaking process" and, therefore, what is now section 553 (a) (2) should
be repealed.20 5 It was convinced that "the requirement of public participation [in those cases] does not subject departments and agencies to
an unreasonable procedural burden."2 6 Since that time several bills
have sought to accomplish the same result: elimination of section 553
(a) (2) as it is presently constituted.
This study demonstrates that the 1955 Task Force Report of the
Hoover Commission and the bills since introduced into Congress were
correct. The unqualified exemptions from section 553 for all rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" should be repealed. The reasons advanced to justify those
exemptions are not sufficient. At most, those justifications dictate the
need for a more narrowly tailored exemption from usual rulemaking
20 4

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note

205 Id. 159.
206 Id. 160.

6, at 158-59.
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proceedings than is currently found in section 553 (a) (2). The existing "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest"
provision found in section 553 (b) (B) and the "good cause" exemption
found in section 553 (d) (3) provide such an exclusion from the requirements of section 553(b)-(d). They would work an adequate accommodation of the competing interests involved, carefully balancing the
need for public participation against the need for effective, efficient,
expeditious, and inexpensive government administration. And an exemption from the right to petition conferred by section 553(e) seems
no more necessary or justifiable for subsection (a) (2) rulemaking than
for rulemaking already covered by section 553.
The solution proposed here to the difficulties arising from the
repeal of section 553 (a) (2) is bound to put some additional burden on
the agencies who will have to implement it. But the burden involved
in agency use of the section 553 (b) (B) and section 553 (d) (3) exemptions is not likely to be very large. Furthermore, any administrative
burden that is in fact likely to result from the proposed solution would
seem clearly outweighed by the benefits obtained. Repeal of section
553 (a) (2) will, after all, guarantee increased public participation in
rulemaking of the kinds currently excluded from usual procedures by
that provision.
A discouraging discovery made in the course of this study has
been that a number of agencies opposing modification of section 553 (a)
(2) do not seem to have restudied their position carefully and seriously
during the last few years. Statements opposing repeal of these exemptions that were prepared as long as five, ten, or even thirteen years ago
are still used by some agencies as the principal basis for articulating
their current position on this subject. The language of a few such
statements has sometimes not even been modified to reflect subsequent
changes in the law, or obvious changes in circumstances, when they
were reissued in light of a new inquiry on this subject. It is hoped that
the present study can at the very least provoke those agencies who have
opposed modification of section 553 (a) (2) into conducting a serious
and careful reconsideration of their position on the question. That
reconsideration should result in this realization: repeal of the exemptions for rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts" need not seriously disadvantage them in light of existing
exemptions contained in other portions of section 553.
In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the proposal made in
this study would only affect the section 553(a) (2) exemptions for
rulemaking relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." The current proposal would not affect, in any way, the
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existing section 553 (a) (1) exemption for rulemaking involving a
"military or foreign affairs function," or the existing section
553 (a) (2) exemption for rulemaking relating to "agency management
or personnel." Similarly undisturbed would be the exemption from
section 553(b)-(d) of all "interpretative rules" and "statements of
policy" found in section 553(b) (A) and section 553(d) (2). The
above exemptions, when combined with section 553(b) (B) and the
"good cause" exemption found in section 553(d) (3), should provide
fully adequate leeway for all agencies to meet their responsibilities
properly, even after the repeal of section 553(a) (2).

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING
APPENDIX

The following recommendation was made by the Administrative
Conference of the United States at its Third Plenary Session, October
21-22, 1969, in Washington, D. C.
Recommendation No. 16-Elimination of Certain Exemptions From
the APA Rulemaking Requirements
RECOMMENDATION

In order to assure that Federal agencies will have the benefit of the
information and opinion that can be supplied by persons whom regulations will affect, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
public must have opportunity to participate in rulemaking proceedings.
The procedures to assure this opportunity are not required by law,
however, when rules are promulgated in relation to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." These types of rules may nevertheless bear heavily upon non-governmental interests. Exempting them
from generally applicable procedural requirements is unwise. The
present law should therefore be amended to discontinue the exemptions
to strengthen procedures that will make for fair, informed exercise of
rulemaking authority in these as in other areas.
Removing these statutory exemptions would not diminish the
power of the agencies to omit the prescribed rulemaking procedures
whenever their observances were found to be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. A finding to that effect can
be made, and published in the FederalRegister, as to an entire subject
matter concerning which rules may be promulgated. Each finding of
this type should be no broader than essential and should include a
statement of underlying reasons rather than a merely conclusory
recital.
Wholly without statutory amendment, agencies already have the
authority to utilize the generally applicable procedural methods even
when formulating rules of the exempt types now under discussion.
They are urged to utilize their existing powers to employ the rulemaking procedures provided by the Administrative Procedure Act,
whenever appropriate, without awaiting a legislative command to do so.

